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


World Food
Programme

Hunger Hotspots

FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity

June to September 2022 Outlook



Global Network
Against Food Crises

Integrated
actions for
lasting solutions

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Acronyms

ASAL	Arid and semi-arid land
CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
rCARI	remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally displaced person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
LBP	Lebanese pound
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LGA	Local government areas
SNHCP	Safety Net for Human Capital Programme
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
UN	United Nations
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

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Executive Summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 20 countries or situations (including two regional clusters) – called hunger hotspots – during the outlook period from June to September 2022.

Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. The recently published 2022 Global Report on Food Crises alerts that 193 million people were facing Crisis or worse (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 or above) across 53 countries or territories in 2021. This increase must be interpreted with care, given that it can be attributed to both a worsening acute food insecurity situation and a substantial (22 percent) expansion in the population analysed between 2020 and 2021. In addition, an all-time high of up to 49 million people in 46 countries could now be at risk of falling into famine or famine-like conditions, unless they receive immediate life and livelihoods-saving assistance. This includes 750 000 people already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen remain at the highest alert level as in the previous edition of this report. In the current report, Afghanistan and Somalia have been added to the list. These countries all have some populations identified or projected to experience starvation or death (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, and require the most urgent attention.

In Afghanistan, for the first time since the introduction of IPC in the country in 2011. Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) are present for 20 000 people in Ghor due to limited humanitarian access during the March to May period. In the outlook period, acute food insecurity is projected to increase by 60 percent year-on-year.

After projecting 401 000 people facing Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) in Tigray, Ethiopia, in 2021, only 10 percent of required assistance arrived in the region until March 2022, and local agricultural production – which was 40 percent of the average – was critical for food security and livelihoods. A recent “humanitarian truce” remains fragile but has allowed for some convoys to reach the region. The Famine Review Committee’s 2021 scenarios of a Risk of Famine for Tigray might remain relevant, unless humanitarian access stabilizes.

Although no populations were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Nigeria in the outlook period, the record-high levels of acute food insecurity are of serious concern. Importantly, the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is expected to reach close to 1.2 million people during the peak of the lean season from June to August 2022, including in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe where some local government areas continue to be inaccessible or hard to reach.

In Somalia, a Risk of Famine has been identified through June 2022, under a scenario where rains are significantly below average, food prices increase further, conflict and displacement increase and

humanitarian assistance remains insufficient – 81 000 people will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between April and June.

In South Sudan, a Famine Likely situation, which was present in some areas in 2021, was averted by improved coordination of humanitarian assistance, and hence the projected number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was reduced slightly, to 87 000 between April and July. That said, the situation remains of highest concern.

In Yemen, the food security situation deteriorated significantly compared to last year, including a strong increase in the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), which are projected to reach 161 000 over the outlook period. There is also a Risk of Famine projected for some areas.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, the Sahel region, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic remain countries of very high concern, as in the previous edition of this report. In this edition, Kenya is added to the list. This is due to the high number of people in critical food insecurity coupled with worsening drivers expected to further intensify life-threatening conditions. Sri Lanka, West African coastal countries (Benin, Cabo Verde and Guinea), Ukraine and Zimbabwe have been added in the list of hotspot countries compared to the January 2022 edition of this report. Angola, Lebanon, Madagascar and Mozambique remain hunger hotspots.

Organized violence and conflict remain the primary drivers for acute hunger, with key trends indicating that conflict levels and violence against civilians continued to increase in 2022. Moreover, weather extremes such as tropical storms, flooding and drought remain critical drivers in some regions.

Ripple effects of the war in Ukraine have been reverberating globally against the backdrop of a gradual and uneven economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, steadily increasing food and energy prices, and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Disruptions to the Ukrainian agricultural sector and constrained exports reduce global food supply, further increase global food prices, and finally push up already high levels of domestic food price inflation. Additionally, high fertilizer costs are likely to affect yields and therefore the future availability of food. Adding to the economic instability, civil unrest could emerge in some of the most affected countries in the upcoming months. Finally, humanitarian organizations are seeing sharp cost increases for their operations and reduced global attention risking to translate into increasing funding shortages.

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 20 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of these hotspots – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – humanitarian actions are critical to preventing starvation and death. This report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for emergency response as well as anticipatory action to address existing humanitarian needs and ensure short-term protective interventions before new needs materialize.

Introduction

For the outlook period from June to September 2022, FAO and WFP are issuing an early warning for urgent humanitarian action in 20 hunger hotspots. These are countries or regional clusters where parts of the population are likely to face a significant deterioration of already high levels of acute food insecurity in the coming months that will put their lives and livelihoods high at risk.

Identified through forward-looking analysis, these hotspots have the potential for acute food insecurity to rise during the outlook period, under the effects of often multiple overlapping drivers, interlinked or mutually reinforcing. These fall under the categories of organized violence and conflict, economic shocks, weather extremes and climate variability, and animal and plants pests and diseases.

Organized violence and armed conflict remain the primary driver of acute food insecurity across regions and in the majority of the hunger hotspots. This reflects a global trend where conflict continues to affect the largest share of people facing acute food insecurity. In 2021, more than 70 percent of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity were living in conflict-affected countries,¹ and key trends indicate that conflict levels and violence against civilians have continued to increase in 2022.²

Economic concerns are additionally driving food insecurity, as the world economy – still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic – has slowed down due to global supply chain disruptions, high levels of inflation and increasing public debt. The war in Ukraine has exerted an upward pressure on already elevated global food prices, with major effects on acute food insecurity.

Weather extremes such as heavy rains, tropical storms, hurricanes, flooding, drought and increased climate variability remain significant drivers in some countries and regions. Recurrent La Niña conditions since late 2020 are causing crop and livestock losses, particularly in East Africa, Central Asia and the Caribbean.

Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. The recently published 2022 Global Report on Food Crises found that 193 million people faced Crisis or worse levels (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) of acute food insecurity across 53 countries or territories in 2021.³ This is an increase of almost 40 million people compared to the previous high reached in 2020 – the year when COVID-19 measures including lockdowns heavily affected food security. This increase must be interpreted with care, given that it can be attributed to both a worsening acute food insecurity situation and a substantial (22 percent) expansion in the population analysed between 2020 and 2021.

In addition, an all-time high of up to 49 million people in 46 countries across the globe could be at risk of falling into famine or famine-like conditions, unless they receive immediate life and livelihoods-saving assistance.⁴ This includes 750 000 people⁵ in Catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5), 401 000 of them in Ethiopia,⁶ the remaining in Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen.

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 20 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of these – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – humanitarian action is critical to prevent starvation and death. To this end, the present report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for:

- **anticipatory action** – short-term protective interventions to be implemented before new humanitarian needs materialize; and
- **emergency response** – actions to address existing humanitarian needs.

Given a strict set of methodological parameters, the hunger hotspot countries and situations were selected through a consensus-based process, which involved FAO and WFP Rome-based and field-based technical teams, as well as analysts specialized in conflict, economic risks and natural hazards. The parameters used in the forward-looking analysis include:

- Assessed projections of acute food insecurity for the outlook period based on analysis of:
 - a) primary and secondary drivers, namely economic shocks, adverse climate conditions and weather shocks, conflict and political violence, and outbreaks of plant pests and animal diseases; and
 - b) the socioeconomic parameters of each country based on assessments of macroeconomic stability (including, among others, debt stocks, foreign-exchange reserves and exposure to balance-of-payment crises), and the current rise of international and national food prices (especially for countries importing large shares of their food requirements).
- Absolute numbers of people projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of these levels of acute food insecurity in the overall population analysed.
- Presence of natural hazards, conflict and economic risks, including the potential ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, that are likely to have a direct impact on food insecurity (such as unforeseen weather shocks) or an indirect one (for example, increased internal displacement) over the outlook period.
- Ongoing or planned agricultural activities for the June to September period, and existing or likely disruptions caused by different events or risks.
- Presence of significant operational and humanitarian access constraints.

The main sources of data on acute food insecurity (current and projections) are the IPC and CH. For countries where IPC/CH analyses were not conducted and where no recent analyses were available, estimates of the number of people in acute food insecurity were primarily derived from the IPC-compatible analysis of the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET),

WFP assessments using the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI), including its application to remotely collected data (rCARI) and Humanitarian Needs Overviews.

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH as data sources on Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity. When recent IPC/ CH is not available, alternative sources have been considered such as FEWS NET or the WFP CARI or rCARI scale. Because overall comparability of CARI and rCARI to IPC is not established, in those cases its use has been acknowledged with a note.

Caution in reading numbers based on different methodologies should be observed.

WFP’s open-access Hunger Map Live, and specifically near-real time data on insufficient food consumption (i.e. poor and borderline, according to Food Consumption Score), collected through phone surveys, was used to inform trend analysis and as a triangulation tool during the assessment phase.

The cut-off date for the analysis and information contained in this report was 10 May 2022.

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises initiative, to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises. In May 2022, the Global Network, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, released the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises, which highlights the number of people estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of these numbers within the population analysed in 2021. The report is available at fightfoodcrises.net and fsinplatform.org.

IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/ Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. 	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. 	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC Phase 5). In order for an area to be classified Famine, at least 20 percent of households should be in IPC Phase 5.

The classification of areas in Famine Likely is permitted when all IPC protocols for Famine classification are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for all three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition (GAM), and crude death rate. Areas can be classified as Famine Likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will occur. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity

To identify hunger hotspots, FAO and WFP have assessed how key drivers of acute food insecurity are likely to evolve and have combined effects across countries in the coming months, and the related risks of deteriorations. Below is an overview of key findings.

Organized violence and conflict risks

Organized violence and armed conflict are key drivers of acute food insecurity in eastern **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **Ethiopia**, northern **Nigeria**, northern **Mozambique**, central **Sahel**, **Somalia**, **South Sudan**, **Syrian Arab Republic**, **Ukraine** and **Yemen**.

Since the release of the last Hunger Hotspots report in January 2022, the number of conflict events spiked with 3 807 events in March compared to 2 537 in January based on ACLED data, indicating an increasing trend.⁷ Violence has reduced people's access to food by destroying or disrupting their livelihoods, including agricultural activities, and commercial trade, services and markets through the imposition of movement restrictions and administrative impediments. In particular, conflict has led to new waves of displacement, forcing people to abandon their land and other livelihoods, reducing also the availability of food for their communities and markets. These trends are likely to continue or intensify in these countries in the outlook period, especially as several countries are facing sensitive political processes and as the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine are expected to maintain high food prices, putting additional strain on communities.

The war in **Ukraine** has already caused immense destruction of livelihoods, supply chains, infrastructure and contamination with explosive ordinances in the country, as well as large-scale displacement in the country and regionally. Ukraine being a major global food supplier, current supply disruptions are aggravating already high international prices, which complicates access to food and could result in localized shortages. With hostilities likely to persist in some regions and affect agricultural activities, together with supply chains disrupted, also food availability could become a challenge in Ukraine and globally if export supplies from other exporters fail to fill the gap.

Despite a "humanitarian truce" and the arrival of the first convoys of humanitarian assistance as well as availability of local agricultural output in Tigray in **Ethiopia** the situation remains unpredictable. Any new outbreak of fighting could lead to further major acute food insecurity considering the existing catastrophic situation in the region. Meanwhile, violence is on the rise in other regions, such as Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali regions, causing large-scale displacement. Similarly, a recent truce in **Yemen**, for an initial period of two months, has led to a reduction of hostilities. However, it remains unclear whether it will hold and potentially be extended beyond May.

In the eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, armed groups will likely expand into new territory and intensify their operations in the coming months, including attacks against civilians. In the **Sahel**, the security situation has further deteriorated, with **Burkina Faso** replacing **Mali** in 2021 as the epicentre of violence in the region, and the **Niger** experiencing a record year of conflict, while conflict conditions also worsening in Mali. Northern **Nigeria** continues to be affected by insurgency in the northeast, which disrupts agricultural livelihoods and causes new displacement. Insurgent attacks have also resurged over the past months in northern **Mozambique**. Episodes of intercommunal violence over land and other resources are also likely to continue in the **Sudan's** Darfur region amidst rising tensions. In **South Sudan**, subnational conflict between armed groups and armed youth as well as clashes between cattle keepers and farmers are likely to continue rising in the coming months. In **Somalia**, violence and displacement are likely to increase around highly contested presidential elections in the coming months, while al-Shabaab is likely to further capitalize on the security vacuum. In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, the northwest of the country is constantly at risk of new high-intensity hostilities between government and rebel forces, while the conditions of the refugees displaced in the area are deteriorating.

Conflict is not only one of the main drivers of acute food insecurity in these countries but contributes also to the highest levels of acute food insecurity, critical or catastrophic conditions. Several of these countries and regions are also situations of highest concern, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, highlighting not only the magnitude but the severity of the impact of this man-made shock on food insecurity.

Natural hazard risks

Recurrent La Niña events since late 2020 have impacted agricultural activities, causing crop and livestock losses in many parts of the world including Afghanistan and Eastern Africa. The latest forecast indicates that La Niña conditions will continue through August–October 2022, with the probability of 58 percent and increasing slightly through the end of 2022.⁸ This could drive above-average rainfall across the Sahel and increase hurricane intensity in the Caribbean, and could, along with a forecast negative Indian Ocean Dipole, negatively affect the next Deyr/short rainy season in the Horn of Africa.

In **Afghanistan**, despite above-average rains in early spring, erratic and below-average precipitation is expected through May 2022, likely reducing yields and resulting in crop losses. This is in addition to the diminishing snowpack in late March, which has reduced water availability for irrigation of summer crops. Although still uncertain, if La Niña conditions last until northern hemisphere autumn, it could also impact the start of the 2022/23 agricultural season and further worsen the food security situation.

In **Eastern Africa**, rainfall deficits of up to 60 percent of the average⁹ and prolonged dry spells recorded in large parts of **Somalia**,¹⁰ southern and eastern **Ethiopia**¹¹ and eastern **Kenya** since the start of the *Gu* rainy season (typically March to May) are likely to further exacerbate the food security situation.

In addition, the latest forecasts indicate below-average rainfall to last until the end of June, posing severe threat to crop production and livestock.

This would be an unprecedented fourth consecutive drought in some areas since late 2020, likely to further worsen the food security situation, particularly in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya, large parts of Somalia, and southern and eastern Ethiopia (including Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region [SNNPR] and Somali regions). In **South Sudan**, slightly below-average rains have been recorded since the start of the season in March, but the latest forecasts indicate, with high likelihood, above-average rainfall for the remainder of the season, leading to good prospects for crops but also increasing the risk of major flooding in some areas. This could be the fourth consecutive above-average rainy season, resulting in displacement and crop damages, with southern and eastern areas at highest risk.

In **Western Africa**, **Benin** and **Guinea** are expected to see average to below-average rainfall for the rest of the season until October 2022, with uneven distribution of rainfall across the two countries. This is likely to result in reduced yields and crop losses as well as below-average pasture for livestock. In the Middle Belt and southern regions of Nigeria, the latest forecasts indicate an increased likelihood of below-average rainfall which could reduce yields and result in crop losses, with a potential impact on food prices, northern parts of **Nigeria** and large parts of the **Sahel** are expected to see average to above-average rainfall with good prospects for crops, but also an increased risk of localized flooding. In **Cabo Verde**, the July to October rainy season is also expected to be below average.

In **Southern Africa**, **Angola** has experienced a fifth consecutive year of drought conditions in southern provinces, with the 2020/21 season being the worst in the last 40 years in some areas. This will continue to further deteriorate crop conditions and pastures, leading to crop and livestock losses over the coming months as well as an early start of the lean season. In southern **Madagascar**, severe drought conditions in the southern and southwestern areas have reduced crop production prospects. This follows three consecutive years of poor harvest in some areas. In southern **Mozambique** and parts of **Zimbabwe**, the above-average rainfall in late April was not sufficient to overcome the impact of erratic rains in January–February, likely leading to below-average crop production during the main and second harvest from April to August. Between January and March, heavy rains associated with tropical cyclones Ana, Dumako and Gombe caused massive flooding in Madagascar, Mozambique and parts of Zimbabwe, causing damages to crops and livestock.

In **Haiti**, despite above-average rains since the start of the season, the latest forecasts indicate below-average rainfall for the remainder of the season until the end of June, which may adversely affect summer crops and the main maize production season. In addition, early forecasts for the **2022 hurricane season** in the Caribbean indicate an earlier start of the season in May and a likely above-average season for the third consecutive year, with the main risk areas including Haiti.

Economic risks

Following the 3.1 percent pandemic-related contraction in 2020, the global economy recovered in 2021, growing by 6.1 percent, and this growth continued into the first quarter of 2022.¹² However, already before the inception of the war in Ukraine, economic growth slowed down due to global supply disruptions and record public debt.¹³ Reflecting the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reduced its forecast of global growth in 2022 by 0.8 percentage points to 3.6 percent.¹⁴

Among major economic risks, soaring food prices will continue to be the major driver of acute food insecurity numbers over the coming months. Since mid-2020, food prices have been showing an increasing trend driven by a recovery in global demand, rising agricultural input prices, persisting supply-chain disruptions and weather shocks affecting agricultural production in several countries. In March 2022, benchmark international food prices had already reached record highs when the war in Ukraine exacerbated existing trends due to, among others, the disruption to trade in key food commodities from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, both major food exporters. The FAO Food Price Index has reached 158.5 points, surpassing the previous peaks of 132.5 and 137.6 recorded during the 2007–2008 and 2011 food crises, respectively.¹⁵ Despite reducing 1.2 points (0.8 percent) from the record level in March 2022, the April value of the index still surged by 36.4 points (29.8 percent) compared to the same month in the previous year. This price increase was mainly driven by vegetable oils and cereal prices, which increased by 75.3 points (46.5 percent) and 43.3 points (34.3 percent), respectively.¹⁶

Economies of developing countries, many of which are still struggling with the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, could be further destabilized by the current slowdown of the global economic recovery. During the pandemic, some governments introduced significant fiscal stimuli to support household incomes and stabilize economies. These large public expenditures – during a period when tax receipts fell and foreign-exchange reserves declined – have increased the risk of debt distress. Moreover, the tightening of monetary policies in advanced economies to address the rapid increase of inflation rates have complicated access to credit and debt refinancing for developing economies since the end of 2021.¹⁷ This has led in some cases to the adoption of austerity policies that are having adverse impacts on household incomes. Furthermore, countries heavily reliant on global markets for hydrocarbons and food might have to pay larger amounts for their imports. This could lead to difficulties financing imports of essential needs and further increase the risk of currency depreciation and debt distress.

Unequal access to COVID-19 vaccines as well as policies employed to mitigate the impact of the pandemic have created widening gaps vis-à-vis the recovery pace of advanced economies where more effective vaccination campaigns have facilitated the reopening of economic activities. Additionally, new COVID-19 outbreaks in China during the first half of 2022 have renewed disruptions of supply chains and have the potential to affect global trade again in the next months.

The sharp increase in food prices worldwide is already having extended effects on political stability across all regions in the form of protests, particularly in Asia,¹⁸ Southern Africa¹⁹ and the Middle East.²⁰ The 2007–2008 world food crisis, where a large global food price spike coincided with other factors such as high youth unemployment rates and structural macroeconomic problems, triggered food riots causing political instability and social unrest in 48 countries, in particular across Asia and Africa.²¹ In the early 2010s, this was also followed by a series of anti-government protests in the Middle East and North Africa due to high domestic food prices.²² Similarly, the currently soaring global food prices will further increase domestic food prices in developing countries in the next months, although domestic policies could limit the transmission. Adding to the economic instability as well as – in some cases – reduced availability of food due to severe weather shocks, social tensions could emerge in the most affected countries in the next months.

In the **Middle East and North Africa**, the protracted economic impact of COVID-19 and the repercussions of rising international food prices have overlapped with socioeconomic damages caused by the ongoing conflicts in **Yemen** and the **Syrian Arab Republic**, leading to significant increases of poverty and food insecurity. In **Lebanon**, the ongoing financial and economic collapse since the end of 2019 and aggravated by the pandemic, and more recently, by the increase of international commodity prices, has continued to worsen the food security situation.

In **Latin America**, the Haitian economy is expected to remain in a state of crisis in the outlook period, reflecting the weak currency and increasing international food prices.

In **Asia**, a strong economic recovery since the end of 2020 has been slowed down by renewed supply-chain disruptions and emerging macroeconomic difficulties in several countries, including **Sri Lanka**. In **Afghanistan**, the economic crisis following the political transition coupled with the impact of below-average harvests is causing unprecedented levels of hunger across the country.

In nearly all **African countries** flagged in this report, high food prices are already a key driver of acute food insecurity and the steep increases in international food prices will further escalate this situation during the outlook period. Due to the large import dependency of fuel and food, the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine could further destabilize economies. Additionally, **Ethiopia** and **Kenya** have to manage high debt levels during consecutive droughts and the concurrence of other drivers of food insecurity.

The global ripple effects of the war in Ukraine

The Russian Federation and Ukraine exported nearly 30 percent of the wheat traded internationally in 2021 and are also large exporters of other key food commodities, such as maize and vegetable oils. Furthermore, the Russian Federation is a major producer of hydrocarbons and global exporter of fertilizers.²³ Hence, the war in Ukraine which started at the end of February 2022 has caused disruptions to global food and energy markets, which have further pushed up already elevated agricultural commodity and fuel prices. In April 2022, the FAO Food Price Index was 17 percent higher compared to its value in January 2022, and the cereal subindex climbed by over 21 percent since January.²⁴ Global crude oil prices also soared between January and April 2022 with the price of Brent crude oil increasing by 24.5 percent.²⁵

These ripple effects of the war in Ukraine have been reverberating in the global economy against the backdrop of a gradual and uneven recovery of economic activities from the COVID-19 pandemic, steadily rising food and energy prices, and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions globally. Since 2020, poverty rates have been growing worldwide²⁶ along with the number of people experiencing food insecurity. The World Bank warns that every percentage point increase in global food prices will push 10 million people more into extreme poverty around the world.²⁷ According to WFP projections on the transmission of global food and oil price spikes – caused by disrupted supplies from the Russian Federation and Ukraine – on domestic food inflation, the number of acute food insecure people could increase by 47 million in 2022, with largest increases in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁸ According to FAO simulations, the number of undernourished people globally could increase by between 7.6 and 13.1 million people in 2022/23 as a result of the ripple effects of the conflict.²⁹

The war in Ukraine is having both immediate and longer-term effects on food supplies in global markets. Since the first weeks of the war, shipments from Black Sea harbors of Ukraine have stopped and those of the Russian Federation have been reduced in volume, increasing the cost significantly with immediate impacts in particular on countries that depend on food imports. Disruptions to Ukrainian agricultural production, logistics and food processing caused by active fighting and input shortages already affect global food supplies. Additionally, already high fertilizer costs – exacerbated by market uncertainties caused by the war – have reached record levels. High prices coupled with shortages due to disruptions of exports from the region are likely to reduce fertilizer usage in many countries, affecting yields of coming harvests and therefore the future availability of agricultural commodities on international markets.

Efforts to control domestic prices amidst expectations about a decreasing international food supply as well as fear of “importing” food price inflation from the world markets have already prompted an increasing number of countries to limit or ban exports.³⁰ Ad hoc export restrictions currently represent a major risk for international food markets, as a ban-induced rapid drop on the supply side may further boost the pace of price increases and effectively

bar low-income import dependent economies from securing vital food supplies.³¹

The global commodity price spikes are trickling down to domestic inflation. Global consumer price inflation is expected to increase by 7.4 percent in 2022, the highest rate since 1995. Emerging markets and developing countries are expected to see the highest average inflation, at 8.7 percent.³² Countries importing major shares of their food requirements will be affected most. The velocity and magnitude of price transmission into domestic prices vary among countries and products. Food prices in developing countries usually absorb global price changes more rapidly than in developed economies with estimated time lags ranging between two and six months due to shorter supply chains.³³

Furthermore, the war in Ukraine is contributing to uncertainty about energy costs worldwide, with negative consequences for net-importing countries of hydrocarbons. Higher energy prices are compounding the increase of food prices, as fuel represents a key agricultural input, and natural gas is an important input to fertilizer production. Furthermore, economies of low-income countries, already troubled by the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, might be further destabilized due to increasing import bills resulting in currency depreciations or further rising public debt levels. Governments, which were managing curtailed budgets already as a consequence of the pandemic, may struggle to be able to respond adequately to mitigate the economic shocks and support the most vulnerable households.

Finally, while humanitarian needs are already growing worldwide, organizations operating in countries already facing major humanitarian crises are seeing sharp cost increases for their operations and reduced global attention, which could lead to a redirection of international aid. This would translate into increasing funding shortages for numerous humanitarian operations worldwide. The latest Yemen funding appeal was less than a third pledged, while several major humanitarian crises see a gap between funding needs and pledges wider than 50 percent,³⁴ among them are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Animal and plant pests and diseases

The **desert locust** situation remained calm during April as little rain fell and dry vegetation prevailed for a third consecutive month. In the **Horn of Africa**, a few small remnant immature swarms remained at the beginning of April in southern **Ethiopia** where they were likely to move north to eastern parts of the Somali region to mature and breed on a small scale in areas of recent rainfall. Isolated adults also persisted on the southern coast of **Yemen**, where they were expected to move to the interior and breed on a small scale in areas that receive rainfall. The situation is expected to remain calm in all regions until at least October, considering that it would take several generations of successful breeding before locust numbers could increase to threatening levels.

An ongoing outbreak of **African armyworm** is also affecting countries in **East Africa**. In **Kenya**, infestation was reported in 33 counties by end of April, where over 200 000 ha of crop and pasture were destroyed. Measures to contain the situation were put in place by government entities and FAO.³⁵

Aggravating factor: humanitarian access constraints


Urgent and scaled-up assistance is required in all 20 hunger hotspots to protect livelihoods and increase access to food. This is essential to avert a further deterioration of food insecurity and malnutrition. In countries with highest concerns, the provision of humanitarian assistance is crucial to save lives and prevent starvation, death and the total collapse of livelihoods (Catastrophe/Famine, IPC/CH Phase 5). Humanitarian access is limited in various ways, including insecurity due to organized violence or conflict, the presence of administrative or bureaucratic impediments, movement restrictions, and physical constraints related to the environment.

Five countries classified as hunger hotspots are having **extreme access constraints**, according to the December 2021 ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview.³⁶ In **Afghanistan**, humanitarian access constraints continue to be extreme according to ACAPS. That said, reports point to improvements including for physical movement due to a relative stabilization of the security situation.³⁷ Humanitarian access and supply lines remain intermittent, due to insecurity and restrictions, in northern **Ethiopia** as well as other parts of the country, severely limiting humanitarian operations. In **Mali**, humanitarian access remains extremely constrained due to insecurity, particularly in the northern, central and southern regions. In conflict-affected northern **Nigeria**, extreme access constraints are likely to continue in the outlook period due to persistent insecurity. While some areas with high levels of critical acute food insecurity remain out of reach. Humanitarian constraints are also extreme in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, especially in areas under opposition control in the northwest.

Six countries are classified as having **very high access constraints** according to the December 2021 ACAPS overview. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, insecurity is resulting in the frequent suspension of humanitarian activities, while administrative procedures remain challenging for humanitarian organizations, attacks against humanitarian workers are frequent, and natural disasters limit people's access to services and humanitarian assistance. In the **Niger**, access constraints remain very high particularly along the border area with Burkina Faso and Mali, and at the border with Nigeria, mainly due to insecurity. In **Somalia**, the unstable political situation and complex conflict dynamics complicate humanitarian operations, and access is also hindered by bureaucratic impediments and impassable roads. In **South Sudan**, humanitarian access remains highly constrained due to violence and clashes in some parts of the country, as well as logistical constraints including extensive flooding and very poor road networks.

Number of people in acute food insecurity in hotspot countries

In 2022 (most recent projection), in millions



The data presented is most recent projection, data is from 2022 except for Ethiopia, Honduras, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen (all 2021) and the Syrian Arab Republic (2020). For the remaining hotspots, no recent IPC/CH or WFP CARI data is available. ¹Most current data reported is non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 18. In Afghanistan, 20 000 people are in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the March–May 2022 projection. ²Less than 50 percent of population covered by IPC/CH. The IPC analysis released in May 2021 is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. This report has not been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia. For July to September 2021, IPC estimates are available for a smaller area in populations covered (Belg-dependent areas, with 7.4 million people in Crises or worse [IPC 3 Phase and above], including 401 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)). ³Less than 50 percent of the population covered by IPC/CH. ⁴Based on WFP CARI. Data is from 2021. Severely food insecure include 1.8 million people residing in camps who are considered food insecure and in need of full support. ⁵Based on WFP CARI/rCARI. Data is from 2021. The 2 million people include 735 000 Syrian refugees who are acute food insecure according to the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees. The WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of WFP rCARI analyses and the results of traditional WFP CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed. ⁶WFP CARI is used to classify individual households according to their level of food insecurity. All indicators included within the WFP CARI approach can be incorporated within IPC analysis. Data used relates to acute food insecurity. ⁷Prevalence of the population analyzed expressed in percentage terms. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf. Overall comparability between IPC/CH and WFP CARI is not established.

In **Ukraine**, the December 2021 ACAPS analysis reported that humanitarian access had deteriorated and become very highly constrained during the six months prior because of increasing security incidents and recorded ceasefire violations. Since the beginning of the war in February 2022, access has deteriorated significantly, with Mariupol and other contested areas with active conflict in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts being some of the most inaccessible territories in the country.

In **Yemen**, humanitarian access continues to be challenging across the country as a result of conflict, insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and civil unrest. It remains to be seen if the temporary truce declared in April will result in improvements in access.

Explanatory note

Famine is the most severe level of hunger and accordingly, it is the most extreme phase of the IPC/CH scale (Phase 5). As per the IPC definition, Famine occurs in areas where: "at least one in five households has or is most likely to have an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution, and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or will be occurring."³⁸ Households may be classified in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if the area is not classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This is the case when less than 20 percent of the population is experiencing Famine conditions.

Famine classification and related projections are subject to a rigorous technical process at country level which is validated by an external Famine Review Committee led by international food security nutrition and mortality experts. IPC also assesses the Risk of Famine. This refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most likely scenario, it is a scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

The purpose of this section is to highlight situations where specific factors are contributing to a risk of a further deterioration of critical levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) and a possible occurrence of Catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5), should certain conditions, including humanitarian access constraints, persist. The information contained in this section should therefore not be interpreted as a statement that Famine is imminent in analysed hotspots. Given the severity of these situations, an understanding of the key drivers and how they may deteriorate over the outlook period provides critical early warning information that can support a scale-up of monitoring efforts as well as advocacy and interventions to curb further deterioration.

Highest concern: Hotspots with catastrophic conditions

This category includes (i) countries already with populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5), and (ii) countries at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, i.e. where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing severe aggravating factors – especially access constraints – that indicate a further deterioration and possible occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period. Per definition, this category also includes countries with Famine or Risk of Famine.

New highest alerts are issued for Afghanistan and Somalia for the June to September 2022 outlook. These countries add to Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen, which remain highest alert hotspots also for this edition. These countries all have parts of populations identified or projected to experience starvation or death (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, and require the most urgent attention. No updated IPC analysis is available for Ethiopia, the latest being from May 2021. This lack of information is a major concern.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, acute food insecurity is expected to remain at extremely high levels in the outlook period. For the first time since the introduction of IPC in Afghanistan, Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) are present for 20 000 people in Ghor due to limited humanitarian access during the March to May period. Overall, 18.9 million are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between June and November – 6 million of them in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁹ In the outlook period, food insecurity numbers are projected to increase by almost 60 percent compared to the same period last year, and although the cereal harvest season is approaching, acute food insecurity is projected to reduce only slightly.

Compared to peak food insecurity in the November 2021 to March 2022 period, the reduction of the population facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity from March to May has been minimal and mainly driven by efforts in scaling up humanitarian assistance to an estimated 40 percent of the population.

Seasonal improvements in food security following winter grains harvest from May onwards might be limited due to consecutive drought-induced winter crop losses stemming from below-average cumulative precipitation throughout the rainy season.

Poor households in rural and urban areas are also still suffering from high unemployment, significant levels of debt, reduced incomes and high food prices as a result of the ongoing economic crisis, limiting their purchasing power.⁴⁰ These households are likely to continue to face difficulty meeting their essential food and non-food needs.

The war in Ukraine is likely to further aggravate the situation, as Afghanistan remains heavily reliant on imported food and fuel. The war also brings the risk of diverting donor attention and funding away from Afghanistan.⁴¹ While the overall security situation continued to stabilize since the takeover by the de facto authorities, attacks by non-state armed groups and intragroups fighting is expected to increase in the outlook period,⁴² causing new displacement and access constraints.⁴³

Ethiopia

After a large number of people were projected to face Catastrophic conditions – amounting to 401 000 people between July and September 2021 or equivalent to 10 percent of the population in some areas of Tigray – only 10 percent of required assistance arrived in Tigray between July 2021 and March 2022.⁴⁴ As of May 2022, the region remains cut off from some services.^{45,46} A recent “humanitarian truce” in Tigray remains fragile but has allowed for nine convoys to reach the region since the beginning of the year.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, escalating intercommunal violence and armed conflict in Amhara and Oromia are leading to new displacement and disrupting livelihoods.

The truce coincides with the start of the rainy and agricultural seasons. In 2021, main season production was 40 percent of normal,⁴⁸ but still amounted to about seven to eight months of the total annual requirements in Tigray, due in part to inputs provided by humanitarian actors. This was crucial for food security and livelihoods, considering the high dependence on agriculture in these areas. Poor 2022 agricultural production could result in a dramatic increase of food insecurity, and continued inflow of humanitarian support including agricultural inputs is therefore critical.

Needs are also at risk of further escalating in southern and eastern Ethiopia due the current severe drought and the threat of a fourth consecutive below-average rainy season, which the government and humanitarian partners have also not been able to respond to with adequate levels of food and livelihood assistance due to funding shortages. The situation is compromising fragile livelihoods, increasing risks of human and livestock disease outbreaks, and eroding the coping capacities of the most vulnerable. Additionally, major economic challenges will likely be further aggravated by Ethiopia’s high dependence on fuel, fertilizer and wheat imports, further increasing already high local food prices

Overall, 18 million people were estimated to require food assistance in Ethiopia in 2021, and this number is likely to have increased further. Considering the uncertainty, complexity and the severity of the situation, the lack of updated IPC data for Ethiopia remains a major concern, as the projection period of the latest IPC, which the Famine Review was also based on, ended in September 2021.⁴⁹ Acute food insecurity in Tigray and neighboring areas remains extremely concerning and could further rise if humanitarian access does not further improve and the main harvest season fails. The Famine Review Committee’s July 2021 warning of a Risk of Famine for Tigray was based on limited humanitarian assistance, increasing conflict levels and low availability of commercial goods

and services. Given recent developments and unless humanitarian access stabilizes, these scenarios might remain relevant.⁵⁰

Nigeria

Reaching the highest level on record, about 19.5 million people are projected to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity in Nigeria during the lean season (June–August 2022), including 1.2 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4), if humanitarian interventions are not scaled up and sustained.⁵¹ Reflecting the high numbers of food insecurity, the situation remains extremely concerning in the conflict-affected areas of northern Nigeria, where insecurity and access challenges are likely to persist. Even though humanitarian assistance, including food assistance and support to agricultural livelihoods, has brought some relief in the northeast, there is a marked deterioration of acute food insecurity levels projected for the lean season (June–August), combined with an outlook of continued insecurity and access challenges.⁵²

Several local government areas (LGAs) are inaccessible or hard to reach by humanitarian assistance due to insecurity in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. These three states contain about half the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4), and more than one quarter of people in critical need of emergency assistance (CH Phase 4) in Borno are projected to be located in inaccessible areas where access to life-saving assistance is expected to be lacking. Strong efforts are needed to reach those most vulnerable populations with humanitarian assistance. In the Cadre Harmonisé March 2022 update, no populations were classified in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5), unlike in the previous analysis. However, the record-high levels of acute food insecurity are of serious concern. Importantly, the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is expected to reach close to 1.2 million people during the peak of the lean season from June to August 2022, including in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe where some LGAs continue to be inaccessible or hard to reach. Precarious security conditions, macroeconomic challenges,⁵³ high and further increasing food prices⁵⁴ and a prospect of localized below-average harvests⁵⁵ are likely to further aggravate acute food-insecurity levels also outside Borno State in the outlook period, while acute malnutrition prevalence remains high in several states, and exceeding 15 percent in three LGAs of Sokoto State.^{56,57}

Somalia

Following three consecutive seasons of severe rainfall deficits, resulting in below-average harvests, widespread livestock deaths and climate and conflict-induced displacements, rainfall forecasts show an increased probability of an unprecedented fourth consecutive failed rainy season, eroding livelihoods and increasing the severity of food insecurity.^{58,59,60} Domestic food prices are already almost approaching levels of the 2011 Famine⁶¹ and are expected to continue rising due to limited availability of food, compounded by global trends and dependency on wheat imports from the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Livelihoods have also been severely affected by violence, which could further escalate in the coming months, potentially resulting in

further displacement and humanitarian access constraints.⁶² As a result, more than 6 million people – 38 percent of the population – are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between April and June 2022, including 1.7 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 81 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). There is a Risk of Famine in the zones of Hawd Pastoral of Central and Hiran, Addun Pastoral of Northeast and Central, Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral and IDP settlements in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Dhusamareb through June 2022 under a scenario where the 2022 *Gu* rains fail, food prices continue to rise sharply, conflict and displacement increase, and humanitarian assistance fails to keep up with increased needs and is unable to reach the most vulnerable populations.⁶³ Widespread deterioration of nutritional status is expected to continue due to high levels of food insecurity, water scarcity, increased prevalence of communicable diseases and drought-induced displacement.

Past events demonstrate the potential for multi-season droughts to lead to Famine in Somalia, as observed between October 2010 and April 2012,⁶⁴ when an estimated 260 000 people died of hunger related causes. Timely humanitarian action prevented more extreme outcomes during the severe drought of 2016/17. Urgent and timely scaling up of humanitarian assistance is therefore required to prevent extreme food insecurity and malnutrition outcomes, including the Risk of Famine through June 2022⁶⁵ and increasing humanitarian needs over the remainder of 2022.

South Sudan

An anticipated fourth consecutive year of extensive flooding,⁶⁶ coupled with incidents of conflict and insecurity, and macroeconomic challenges, is likely to further increase already very high levels of food insecurity in South Sudan, as the lean season peaks. This includes the continued presence of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

The most recent IPC analysis projected that 7.7 million people would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between April and July 2022.⁶⁷ This includes almost 2.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 87 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). These numbers show a 7 percent increase in the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), and a 17 percent increase of people in Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 or above) in comparison to the same period last year. Populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are located in counties in Jonglei, Lakes, and Unity states, and Greater Pibor Administrative Area.⁶⁸

A Famine Likely situation, which was present in some payams of Pibor county in 2021, was averted by improved coordination of humanitarian assistance, and hence the projected number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was reduced slightly from 108 000 to 87 000, with no payam reaching the Famine threshold of 20 percent. That said, the situation remains of highest concern despite the significant deployment of humanitarian assistance.

The situation is further aggravated by a below-average cereal harvest in 2021, resulting in a significant cereal gap for 2022 and increasing

commodity prices.⁶⁹ As the lean season progresses, resource-based intercommunal conflicts are also expected to intensify,⁷⁰ and access to food will be further constrained due to limited livelihood opportunities.⁷¹

Yemen

In a stark deterioration of the food security situation compared to last year, over 19 million people are expected to experience Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between June and December 2022 – including 7.1 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is projected to increase five-fold to 161 000, compared to the January to May 2022 estimate. This projection is based on assumptions of continuing conflict, a deepening economic crisis and reduction of humanitarian assistance. There is a Risk of Famine for two districts in Hajjah governorate⁷² under a worst-case scenario, assuming escalating conflict and assistance limited by funding shortfalls. Additionally, should a worst-case scenario apply for a protracted period beyond December, also two districts of Al Hudaydah governorate⁷³ could shift into Famine.⁷⁴ Acute malnutrition is also projected to deteriorate further from June to December 2022 and the Abs and Hayran districts in Hajjah governorate⁷⁵ are classified as Extremely Critical (IPC Phase 5).⁷⁶

While some additional resources have been received since the publication of the IPC analysis in March, humanitarian operations continue to face a critical funding situation in Yemen. The limited resources are forcing humanitarian actors in the country to further reduce their assistance packages and their target population.⁷⁷

A UN-brokered two-months truce was signed in early April, potentially avoiding a further deterioration of the food insecurity situation.⁷⁸ Despite reports about continued fighting in some areas,⁷⁹ the truce has led so far to a rare reduction of hostilities.⁸⁰ However, allegations of ceasefire violations have been reported from both sides, and it remains unclear whether the truce will be extended beyond May. The war in Ukraine might also further compound the economic crisis, as it is likely to further constrain the capacity to import food and fuel and contribute to further rising food prices.

Very high concern: Hotspots with deteriorating critical conditions

Several other hunger hotspots need urgent action to avert extreme hunger or death. These are countries with sizeable populations – over 500 000 people – estimated or projected to be in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity or identified as severely food insecure as per WFP's CARI or rCARI methodology; or countries with more than 10 percent of the analysed population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severely food insecure, and at least 50 percent of the population analysed.

In the included countries, life-threatening conditions are expected to further intensify in the outlook period. Most of the hotspots with deteriorating critical situations were already highlighted in the last edition of the report: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, the Sahel region, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic. In this edition, the alert is extended to also include Kenya.

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, 25.9 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 5.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), between January and June 2022. The recent escalation in conflicts and population movements as well as increasing food prices, could increase the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity especially in eastern provinces.

In **Haiti**, the already alarming food insecurity situation is likely to further deteriorate in the outlook period, due to the economic crisis, political instability, high food and fuel prices and below-average agricultural production. Rising violence is additionally leading to displacement, market disruptions and humanitarian access restrictions. Between March and June, 3.2 million people will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and 1.3 million people Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.

In **Kenya**, prolonged drought conditions and rising food prices are expected to further escalate already high levels of acute food insecurity. The worst drought in decades is considered likely, with a fourth below-average rainy season being currently forecasted.⁸¹ In the arid and semi-arid lands, 3.5 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between March and June 2022, a 75 percent increase compared to the same period in 2021 – including 758 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).⁸²

Unprecedented numbers of food insecure people are projected for the **Sahel region – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger** – as it is experiencing the third consecutive year of a major food and nutrition crisis, which will further worsen if no urgent action is taken.


The poor 2021 rainy season, the near-record high food prices and a deteriorating security context are projected to lead to over 12.6 million people facing Crisis or worse (CH phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between June and August 2022 – including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4)⁸³ – an increase of 120 percent above the five-year average for the Sahel countries.

For the **Sudan**, the outlook period coincides with the lean season. Already between October 2021 and February 2022, about 6 million people were estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), of these, over 1.3 million were facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity. While no newer projections are available, the lean season typically results in a significant increase in the number of acutely food insecure people. The macroeconomic crisis, rising food prices, insufficient crop production, and intercommunal conflict are additional drivers, likely to further aggravate food insecurity levels.

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, a significant number of additional people are at risk of falling into food insecurity in the outlook period, due to the dilapidated economic situation resulting from over a decade of conflict and western sanctions, increasing food prices and expected below-average domestic cereal production. The economic crisis adds to the effects of the ongoing conflict and displacement, resulting in 12 million people facing acute food insecurity in 2021. Of these, 2.5 million people were severely food insecure, including 1.8 million people living in IDP camps.⁸⁴



Acute food insecurity trends in the hotspots of highest and very high concern 2019–2022¹ peak numbers and prevalence



¹ Data for 2022 is considered as expected peak based on information available as of May 2022. For Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic no peak data is available for 2022.

² Based on Flowminder population data. 2021 and 2022 peaks are based on the same projection (November–March).

³ The 2021 peak number is a combination of the December 2020 IPC covering *Belg-* and *Meher*-dependent areas of Ethiopia and the May 2021 IPC covering selected areas of Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The IPC analysis released in May 2021 is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. This report has not been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia.

⁴ Based on WFP CARI. Data used relates to acute food insecurity.

⁵ Prevalence of the population analyzed expressed in percentage terms.

Disclaimer: Comparison over time indicates a general trend however comparability issues exist in terms of:

- (i) geographical/population coverage for Afghanistan (significant increase of population analysed), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (significant increase of population analysed), Ethiopia (significant increase of population analysed), Nigeria (significant increase of population analysed between 2020 [16 states and Federal Capital Territory] and 2021–2022 [21 states and Federal Capital Territory]) and the Sudan (in 2019, the state of West Darfur was not analysed); and
- (ii) analysis time periods for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nigeria and Yemen.

Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered.



Other countries requiring monitoring

Several other countries or situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, require close monitoring. These include countries or situations where data was insufficient or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during the methodological discussions on the basis of other evidence that is identified below for each country. Countries or situations requiring close monitoring also include those that were included as hotspots in the January edition of the report and remain in protracted crisis with high numbers of acute food insecurity, however they lack clear evidence for a likely marked food security deterioration in the outlook period. Such situations of concern include but are not limited to the following countries.

In the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**, the lean season typically occurs in the outlook period of the report, and concerns exist about food security and nutrition following the impact of severe restrictions and prolonged border closures related to the pandemic amidst very high humanitarian access constraints. The first COVID-19 outbreak was confirmed in May 2022. That said, unavailability of updated food insecurity and nutrition data does not allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology.

Myanmar is also of concern. The country experiences high levels of conflict, a stagnant economy and very high access constraints. In September 2021, 13.2 million people (nearly 25 percent of the population) were estimated to be food insecure, as determined based on WFP's rCARI methodology.*⁸⁵


In **Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)**, the lack of recent comparable food security data is concerning. Although evidence points to a tendency towards a relative stabilization of the economic situation, inflation remains very high. Although food is generally available, high prices and low purchasing power hinder access, particularly in a context of rising food prices. Agricultural production is forecast to grow compared to the previous season,⁸⁶ but likely well below pre-crisis levels. The number of migrants and refugees displaced abroad amounted to 6.1 million as of April 2022, with forecasts for 3.5 million in need of food assistance in 2022⁸⁷ – of which 82 percent in Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.

The **Republic of Colombia** hosts 1.8 million migrants and refugees, of which 60 percent are estimated to be food insecure as determined based on WFP's rCARI methodology (*).⁸⁸ The situation of migrants and refugees is exacerbated by more generalized food insecurity in the country - with concerning food security conditions also observed elsewhere in the region - and compounded by significant levels of internal displacement and accelerating food inflation.⁸⁹ About 7.3 million Colombian residents are estimated to have food security related humanitarian needs in 2022.⁹⁰ As determined based on WFP's rCARI methodology (*), moderate and severe food insecurity is affecting 42 percent of the resident population (21.4 million),⁹¹ with severe food insecurity having slightly improved since the end of 2021.⁹²

In Central America, exposure of the agricultural sector to elevated international prices of food and agricultural inputs is of concern as countries in the region will experience the peak lean season during the outlook period. In particular, in **Honduras**, the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is projected to remain high at 2.6 million between June and August 2022, and the projection does not consider exposure to rising food prices. In **Guatemala**, updated data was lacking at the time of writing of the report. However, vulnerable households might increasingly resort to crisis coping strategies as the lean season progresses, with maize reserves held by households as of early May 2022 lower than in the same period in 2021 and 2020.⁹³

In the **Central African Republic**, the food security situation is expected to remain relatively stable at high levels, with 2.2 million people projected in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) due to conflict, population displacement and high food prices between April and August 2022, which coincides with the lean period in most agroclimatic zones of the country.

* **Note:** Comparability between IPC/CH and WFP rCARI is not established. Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed. Data used relates to acute food insecurity. See related endnote for more detail.



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Country narratives

Asia and the Pacific

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, high food prices, consecutive dry conditions

Despite a scale up of humanitarian assistance and cereal harvest season approaching, acute food insecurity is expected to remain at extremely high levels. This is the result of persistent macroeconomic challenges exacerbated by high international commodity prices and the potential impact of consecutive dry conditions.

Despite some stabilization of economic conditions in the first quarter of 2022 with the support of a scaled up humanitarian assistance,⁹⁴ households still face elevated levels of unemployment, high levels of debt and reduced incomes that will continue limiting their purchasing capacity.⁹⁵ In parallel, prices for the food basket, which was 37 percent higher year-on-year in March driven by currency fluctuations,⁹⁶ are likely to remain high. This trend is underpinned by elevated international food prices, which further increased following the onset of the war in Ukraine, while Afghanistan remains heavily reliant on imported food and fuel. Responding to the humanitarian needs in Ukraine may also divert donor's attention away, potentially limiting inflow of humanitarian assistance.⁹⁷

Improvements in food security following winter grains harvest from May onwards might be limited due to drought-induced winter crop losses stemming from erratic rainfall earlier in the season.⁹⁸ Above-average precipitation at the beginning of 2022 supported spring planting, however, snowpack – important for irrigation – was rapidly declining in March.⁹⁹ Below-average precipitation forecasts

through May¹⁰⁰ raise the risk of below-average crop production in 2022.¹⁰¹

While the overall security situation and humanitarian access continued to stabilize since the political transition in August 2021, fighting among armed groups is expected to increase in the outlook period¹⁰² causing new displacement and access constraints, as well as affecting market access.¹⁰³ Current scarcity of resources and elevated levels of food insecurity are also likely to drive intercommunal and ethnic violence targeting especially ethnic minorities in the north.¹⁰⁴

There were 19.7 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between March and May, of these, 6.6 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Due to lack of humanitarian access, 20 000 people in Ghor province are already facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). With the harvest approaching and assuming a reduction in assistance, 18.9 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between June and November – 6 million people of them in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Food insecurity numbers are projected to increase by almost 60 percent compared to the same time last year. Acute malnutrition levels remain high in 28 out of the 34 provinces¹⁰⁵ both in rural and urban areas with 4.7 million children and pregnant and lactating women affected in 2022.¹⁰⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide vulnerable farmers with drought-resistant rice seeds by end of June at the latest or short-cycle vegetable seed varieties, and other agricultural inputs such as fertilizer.
- Support vulnerable livestock keepers with fodder and veterinary treatment packages, including vaccination kits, against disease to sustain animal health and productivity during drought.
- Implement cash-for-work activities by building and rehabilitating water storage and water-source infrastructure to provide income sources for the most vulnerable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) calls for USD 4.4 billion in 2022. This includes USD 2.66 billion for food security and agricultural livelihoods for people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) and USD 287.4 million for nutrition-related interventions.
- Maintain a large-scale crisis response for people facing acute food insecurity in rural and urban areas to predictably meet their most basic food and livelihood needs during the compounded crisis, mitigate loss of life, hunger-induced conflict and migration, and provide the necessary conditions to enable recovery.
 - Ensure continued monitoring of the deteriorating security situation and its impacts on humanitarian access, continue to collaborate with other UN agencies and the de facto authorities to ensure people are reached with food and livelihood assistance.
 - Increase coverage for prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition in drought and conflict-affected areas, using both mobile teams and existing health systems. Wherever possible, these interventions should be delivered as part of an integrated package of health, nutrition and water and sanitation services.

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, high food prices, below-average crop production

The domestic agricultural production and rising international prices, compounded by the ongoing economic crisis, are expected to increase acute food shortages and price inflation which in turn are likely to result in a further deterioration of food security over the next months.

Sri Lanka has been hit by its worst economic crisis since its independence in 1948.¹⁰⁷ The secondary impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the tax cuts introduced shortly before its inception¹⁰⁸ have gravely affected the sustainability of the debt load accumulated by the country over the previous decade.¹⁰⁹ The economic crisis has been also indirectly worsened by the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine on already elevated global food and energy prices.¹¹⁰ The country's current account deficit has widened while its foreign-exchange reserves have dwindled,¹¹¹ resulting in a dramatic currency devaluation, rising food prices and food shortages. In addition, the current economic crisis is increasingly affecting unemployment¹¹² and household incomes, complicating access to essential items.

Rising costs of food, fuel and imported commodities combined with supply chain disruptions and a weakening exchange rate are expected to drive inflation higher in 2022.¹¹³ Availability of food in the outlook period is likely to decrease.¹¹⁴

The harvest of the country's main staple, "Maha" paddy crop, is estimated at a below-average level, mainly due to a ban on the import of chemical fertilizers and pesticides imposed by the authorities between April and November 2021.¹¹⁵ Therefore, Sri Lanka will increasingly rely on imports to cover domestic needs, but the ability to purchase imported supplies will be constrained by a further depreciation of the local currency.

On the political front, the worsening economic crisis has led to country-wide protests. Concerns are mounting over increasing levels of political tension, which could in turn affect the economic trajectory.¹¹⁶

Reduced income and increased food prices affect households' ability to afford sufficient and adequate food. While representative data on food security is not available, a March–April survey with small sample size¹¹⁷ indicated that almost all households have been using food-related coping strategies and almost half of households have been eating less preferred or cheaper food daily. Around one-third of households in rural and urban areas are applying emergency livelihood coping strategies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Seek multilateral and bilateral aid to import and provide chemical fertilizers along with organic fertilizers for the summer growing season and agricultural inputs such as vegetable seeds to vulnerable smallholder farmers.
- Supply high-nutrient animal feed and veterinary health kits to livestock owners including those who have cattle and poultry to mitigate the impacts of the feed shortage from the economic crisis.
- Provide unconditional cash to also support farmers with green gram production as a mid-season short-cycle crop to support food production. If feasible, conduct cash-for-work activities to improve paddy storage and community infrastructure to support daily wage earners and labourers.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Implement continued monitoring and analysis of food security indicators through fact-finding missions and scenario planning to ensure that the government and the humanitarian community are abreast of the food security situation in order to ensure that emergency assistance can be delivered efficiently. An FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) will take place in the country in July.

Latin America and the Caribbean

The Republic of Haiti

Key drivers of food insecurity: political instability and gang-related insecurity, economic crisis, below-average agricultural production

The ongoing economic crisis, successive below-average harvests and rising insecurity will exacerbate already alarming levels of acute food insecurity.

Already elevated global food prices, further exacerbated by the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, are likely to significantly affect food access, considering that Haiti imports about 70 percent¹¹⁸ of its cereals supply. The Haitian gourde depreciated by about 25 percent in February 2022 compared to the same period in the previous year,¹¹⁹ and the price of the reference food basket increased by 54 percent in February 2022 compared to the same month of 2021.¹²⁰

Violence is likely to continue to rise given the growing influence of gangs inside and also increasingly outside of the capital, leading to kidnappings, population movements and disruptions to markets and transport, with effects on prices and food access. Kidnappings already registered a 58 percent increase during the first quarter of 2022 compared to last year.¹²¹ Localized protests driven by insecurity and inflation are likely to continue, with potential for violent unrest.

Following below-average national aggregate cereal output estimated in 2021,¹²² lack of access to inputs will affect the 2022 first season

cereal crops,¹²³ while drier than average weather conditions forecasted for the May–July period¹²⁴ could affect summer crops. Moreover, early forecasts for the 2022 hurricane season (June to November) point to a likely third consecutive above-average season.¹²⁵

According to an IPC projection update analysis conducted in February 2022, during the March–June 2022 period 3.2 million people (32 percent of the population analysed) will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity and 1.3 million people (13 percent of the population analysed) Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In areas affected by the earthquake and tropical storm Grace in August 2021, the food insecurity situation has generally improved or been stable on account of humanitarian assistance,¹²⁶ however, the South Department Coastal Area has shifted from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) as assistance was insufficient. At national level, the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is projected to be larger compared to the same period a year earlier. Elevated global food prices and dry conditions are likely to underpin a continued deterioration of acute food insecurity beyond June, while increasing violence could displace thousands.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Scale up hurricane preparedness by strategically prepositioning stock to facilitate timely delivery of assistance and protect productive assets before a hurricane makes landfall.
- Protect agricultural livelihoods from forecasted drier and hotter than average weather conditions, including through the installation or rehabilitation of water harvesting systems. Distribute drought-tolerant maize, rice and sorghum seeds, as appropriate, and short-cycle varieties, along with tools and technical support ahead of the planting season that starts in June.
- Distribute veterinary supplies and high-nutrient livestock feed while conducting animal disease surveillance activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021–2022 HRP updated version calls for USD 199 million for food security and nutrition interventions targeting 2 million people.
- Provide emergency food and livelihood assistance for people facing Crisis or worse levels (IPC Phase 3 or above) of food insecurity, prioritizing populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the western coastal area of the Sud Department.
 - Reinforce capacities to ensure continued access to populations including continued barge and air services and strengthened actor capacities in access negotiation and mapping.
 - Strengthen analysis on needs in urban areas and adapt emergency programming approaches for urban context.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Define thresholds and triggers for floods/hurricanes and enhance operational readiness that enable anticipatory action ahead of sudden-onset hazards.
- Establish a user-friendly communication channel with a wide coverage area to directly reach communities with timely early warning messaging.
- Support the development of community seed banks and mutual contingency funds (*caisses de résilience*).

West Africa and the Sahel

Coastal countries (the Republic of Benin, the Republic of Cabo Verde, the Republic of Guinea)

Key drivers of food insecurity: rising food inflation, below-average rainfall

During the June–August 2022 period, food insecurity in coastal countries of West Africa and in Cabo Verde is projected to be at its highest since the start of the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) analysis in 2014. The significant worsening of the situation is mostly driven by economic deterioration, below-average rainfall and, in the case of Benin, insecurity.

Food prices in Benin and Cabo Verde have generally followed an upward trend since early 2021, and in March 2022 they were well above the five-year average.¹²⁷ Food prices in Guinea are similarly above the five-year average.¹²⁸ Cabo Verde imports 80 percent of its food and is extremely vulnerable to global food price increases. While the initial economic outlook for 2021 and 2022 was slightly more optimistic than the preceding period, all three countries – still recovering from the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic – are highly indebted and will face significant economic challenges to respond to the food crisis in 2022. Economic and political sanctions imposed on Guinea will hinder the country's recovery, hampered by a further increase in already high prices of imported food, fuel and fertilizers on global and regional markets.¹²⁹

The seasonal climate outlook indicates that the 2022 rainy season for Guinea and Benin will be erratic and below normal. This will likely negatively affect agricultural production in 2022, constraining food availability and access for vulnerable people.¹³⁰ In Cabo Verde, internal production and livelihoods have been affected by five consecutive droughts, and the country is particularly vulnerable to further challenges to production.

A deterioration of security conditions is an additional compounding factor in Benin, where the number of conflict-related fatalities nearly tripled since 2019.¹³¹ The uptick of violence mostly reflects a spill-over from the central Sahel security crisis, as the northernmost border areas of the littoral states host smuggling and trade routes that play an important role in the insurgent ecosystem.¹³² Crucially, attacks have started targeting local communities, raising the risk of displacements and disruption of agricultural livelihoods.

In Benin, over 830 000 people will be food insecure (CH Phase 3 or worse), including 24 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4) during the June–August 2022 period. This is an unprecedented situation which marks a nearly 200 percent increase compared to the same period last year and represents the highest levels since 2014. In Guinea, over 1.2 million people will be food insecure (CH Phase 3 or worse), including 21 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). These figures are also well above last year's (+191 percent) and the five-year average (+377 percent).¹³³

In Cabo Verde, 43 000 people will be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) – including 3 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – during the lean season, four times the long-term average and representing 10 percent of the total population.

While humanitarian access is not yet a major issue in these countries, the deterioration of the security situation in northern Benin may increase challenges in accessing some areas, particularly northern areas bordering the security crisis in the Sahel. Moreover, humanitarian presence and capacity are not as developed as in other areas in the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate last mile, tailored early warning information and advisories on how to protect agricultural livelihoods ahead and during the upcoming season.
- Improve efficiency of existing irrigation schemes (e.g. distribution of drip irrigation kits) and rehabilitate water points (e.g. small dams, troughs, ponds and water pumps).
- Provide feed and water to vulnerable livestock herders before the health of livestock deteriorates.
- Distribute cash plus drought-tolerant agricultural inputs and capacity building on climate smart agriculture. Increase incomes through cash-for-work activities for vulnerable rural householders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Provide immediate life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable populations, especially the populations who have fallen into Emergency (CH Phase 4).

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Strengthen capacities of national institutions for vulnerability assessments and food security and nutrition monitoring.
- Strengthen capacities of national institutions on emergency preparedness and response, including coordination.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria

Key drivers of food insecurity: insecurity, macroeconomic challenges, high food prices

Food insecurity and malnutrition, already at critical levels, are likely to further deteriorate due to conflict and insecurity, high food prices and macroeconomic challenges, reaching unprecedented levels in the outlook period. Of particular concern are a growing number of areas in Borno State classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4), with an indication of a possible deterioration of the critical situation of some population during the peak of the lean season.¹³⁴

Rising insecurity in the northcentre and northwest and insurgent violence in the northeast¹³⁵ are expected to continue to disrupt agricultural livelihoods¹³⁶ and to cause new internal displacements. As of March 2022, 3.16 million people were internally displaced in the northern states,¹³⁷ of which 1.6 million were from Borno State alone. High prices of fuel and inputs, coupled with the high likelihood of poor rains in the southern and middle-belt regions of Nigeria,¹³⁸ weigh on production prospects of the ongoing 2022 main agricultural season, raising concerns about access to food for vulnerable households. Prices of local cereals in early 2022 were up to 25 percent higher year-on-year¹³⁹ and well above the five-year average.¹⁴⁰ Continuing currency weakness, above-average inflation and a growing fiscal deficit in 2022,¹⁴¹ amid increasing costs of

imported foods, including wheat,¹⁴² are likely to add pressure to prices in the outlook period.

About 19.5 million people are projected to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between June and August 2022, including 1.2 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4), if humanitarian interventions are not scaled up.¹⁴³ While the increase of 7 million people is also a result of the geographic expansion of the latest CH analysis – the percentage of food insecure people remains stable in comparison to 2021. The situation remains worrisome, over 1.7 million children under five years of age are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition through to August 2022 – a 34 percent increase compared to the same period in 2021.¹⁴⁴

Of particular concern, humanitarian assistance is unable to reach several local government areas in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states due to insecurity.¹⁴⁵ These three northeast states contain about half the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4). The delivery of humanitarian assistance is likely to continue to be hampered by lingering extreme access constraints in the northeast¹⁴⁶ and limited presence of humanitarian partners in the northwest and northcentre.¹⁴⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute home-gardening inputs to IDPs and host populations to allow for diversification of diets.
- Support agricultural-based livelihoods activities for the upcoming cassava, rice, maize and millet planting season starting in May/June targeting vulnerable households with access to land for cultivation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP called for USD 451 million for food security, USD 59 million for livelihoods interventions and USD 144 million for nutrition interventions.
- Advocate for the scale up of prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition in the northwest states in coordination with the government and nutrition partners.
 - Sustain humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas in the northeast, particularly Borno State and the Middle Belt, allowing for lean-season scale up.
 - Provide conditional cash-based transfers to conflict-affected communities in the northwest and northeast, using the rapid response registry and the national social register where appropriate to establish a predictive, shock responsive social protection mechanism.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Initiate emergency preparedness activities in the northwest and northcentre, in collaboration with the government institute (State Emergency Management Agency/National Emergency Management Agency).
- Distribute energy-efficient stoves to vulnerable households as a deliberate no-regrets protection strategy.

Sahel (Burkina Faso, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Mali, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the Republic of the Niger)

Key drivers of food insecurity: erratic rainfall, high food prices, conflict, localized flooding

For the third consecutive year, the Sahel countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – are facing a major food and nutrition crisis which is projected to lead to unprecedented numbers of food insecure people between June and August 2022.¹⁴⁸ The poor 2021 rainy season, and near-record high food prices, aggravated by the war in Ukraine, and a deteriorating security context, are causing the worst food crisis in a decade, which will further worsen before August if no urgent action is taken.¹⁴⁹

An erratic rainy season in 2021 has led to poor pasture and crop production. All countries, with the exception of Mauritania, have recorded significant losses in production, with the Niger recording a drop of nearly 40 percent compared to the five-year average.¹⁵⁰ Biomass production in western and northern Sahel has been significantly below normal, leading to an early pastoral lean season and abnormal outmigration of pastoral communities.¹⁵¹ The reduced agricultural output in conjunction with the record high level food prices – with increases of more than 50 percent compared to the five-year average for both local and imported commodities – will likely negatively affect livelihoods and increase reliance on negative coping strategies across rural communities.¹⁵² On a more positive note, current long-range forecasts indicate an above-average rainfall season, starting in July. This could lead to good prospects for crops and biomass but also increases the risk of localized floods in some areas.¹⁵³

The security situation across the Sahel will continue to deteriorate in the next few months. In 2021, Burkina Faso replaced Mali as the epicentre of violence, although conflict still escalated in central Mali and it was a record year for conflict for the Niger.¹⁵⁴ In Mali, the economic situation worsened following two military coups and the imposition of sanctions, while the withdrawal of international counter-insurgency forces may further worsen conflict in the centre and northeast of the country.¹⁵⁵ Insecurity is eroding livelihoods, has disrupted markets and trade flows, and has led to the closure of schools and health centres. Crucially, it has driven large-scale population displacements, with currently almost 2.8 million people internally displaced in the Sahel, out of which 1.9 million IDPs in Burkina Faso alone.¹⁵⁶

As a result of these drivers, over 12.6 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH phase 3 or above) levels of food insecurity between June and August 2022, including 1.4 million people in Emergency (Phase 4) – an increase of 120 percent above the five-year average for the Sahel countries.¹⁵⁷ Prevalence of acute malnutrition remains high and above 15 percent in conflict-affected areas. More than 6.3 million children are projected to be affected by acute malnutrition in 2022, reaching a record high for the fifth year in a row, with a 27 percent increase from 2021.¹⁵⁸

Humanitarian access remains extremely limited in conflict-affected areas, with frequent attacks on humanitarian actors and disruption of assistance programmes. All Sahel countries except for Mauritania face high to extreme access constraints.¹⁵⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Rehabilitate/install water conservation, equip market garden wells with solar energy and rehabilitate/develop harvesting systems for crops and market gardening (e.g. zai pits, half-moons).
- Provide conditional cash to support the rehabilitation of degraded lands rural infrastructure, water conservation and harvesting systems before the start of the rainy season in July. In case of a flood forecast, scale up cash-for-work activities (including rehabilitation of dikes and flood barriers, clearing of canals) and the distribution of unconditional cash for the most vulnerable households.
- Disseminate last mile, tailored early warning information and advisories on how to cope with the upcoming agricultural season.
- Initiate preparedness for post-harvest intervention for farmers and pastoralists to prevent the deterioration of their living conditions (including the distribution of materials for the conservation of agricultural products and a cash-for-work programme).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP called for Burkina Faso: USD 224.9 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 40.3 million for nutrition interventions; Chad: USD 216.7 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 66.3 million for nutrition interventions; Mali: USD 234 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 66 million for nutrition interventions; and the Niger: USD 173 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 99.7 million for nutrition interventions.
- Scale up life-saving assistance during the lean season (June–August) to meet the vital needs of crisis-affected populations. Prioritize a cash+ strategy to assist vulnerable households in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) to meet their immediate food and livelihood needs.
 - Support existing social protection programmes targeting the most-at-risk households in high-risk areas during the lean season.
 - Ensure access to a nutritious and affordable diet and to adequate services and practices for pregnant and lactating women, infants and young children through actions in the food, health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and social protection systems.
 - Provide emergency assistance to agropastoral households affected by the 2021 drought through the distribution of livestock feed, including mineral blocks, vaccinations, the establishment of fodder plots and the rehabilitation of pastoral wells.

East Africa

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Key drivers of food insecurity: drought, economic crisis, conflict and intercommunal violence

A prolonged drought in southern and eastern regions, a spiraling economic crisis and ongoing violence are mounting concerns about rising levels of food insecurity in Ethiopia.

The impacts of a fourth consecutive drought are likely to unfold in southern and eastern Ethiopia in the coming months. Below-average rains were observed in March and April, and forecasts indicate below-average rainfall for the remainder of the season in May, resulting in crop losses and poor pastoral conditions. Deteriorating livestock health conditions, elevated livestock deaths and decreasing market value of surviving animals are also impacting the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people, reducing milk access (which is vital for childhood nutrition), increasing the risks of disease outbreaks and inducing displacements.¹⁶⁰

Major economic challenges will likely be further aggravated by Ethiopia's high dependence on fuel, fertilizer and wheat imports, with two-thirds of wheat imports being traditionally sourced from the Russian Federation and Ukraine. As a result, already high local food prices – 43.4 percent food inflation year-on-year in March 2022¹⁶¹ – will likely further increase. Furthermore, already high costs of fertilizers are expected to increase further due to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine.¹⁶²

Violence is escalating in Amhara and Oromia,¹⁶³ leading to new displacement,¹⁶⁴ with spillovers into Benishangul-Gumuz.¹⁶⁵ Insecurity is also increasing in the Somali region.¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile, a recent "humanitarian truce"¹⁶⁷ in Tigray remains fragile¹⁶⁸ but has allowed for nine convoys to reach the region as of 12 May 2022 since the beginning of the year.¹⁶⁹ The truce also coincides with the commencement of the main agricultural season in June. During the 2021 Meher season, 40 percent of average production was achieved,

due in part to agricultural input assistance provided by humanitarian actors.¹⁷⁰ This covered about seven to eight months of the total annual requirements in Tigray and was crucial for rural households in a context of limited food assistance and commercial supplies. If the 2022 main season production is poor, food insecurity would increase dramatically. The continued inflow of humanitarian supplies is therefore critical for 2022 production.

In mid-2021,^{171,172} at least 18 million people were estimated to require food assistance in Ethiopia, including 5.2 million in Tigray. Considering the uncertainty, complexity and the severity of the situation, the lack of updated IPC data for Ethiopia remains a major concern, as the projection period of the latest IPC, which the Famine Review was also based on, ended in September 2021.¹⁷³ The IPC identified 401 000 people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between July and September 2021 in the Tigray region.¹⁷⁴ The Famine Review Committee's July 2021 warning of a Risk of Famine for Tigray was based on limited humanitarian assistance, increasing conflict levels and low availability of commercial goods and services.¹⁷⁵ Given the very recent and fragile improvement of humanitarian access in Tigray, these scenarios are expected to remain relevant, unless humanitarian access does not further improve, and local production continues.

Concerns over high levels of acute food insecurity are mounting also in drought-affected Somali, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) and southern Borena zone of Oromia region where 7.2 million people are estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in March–May 2022¹⁷⁶ – representing a significant deterioration from 4.5 million in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between January and June 2021.^{177,178}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

Though the 2022 HRP is not yet released, the financial ask is expected to be higher than last year given the increased needs. The 2021 HRP Mid-Year Review called for USD 858.9 million for food security and livelihoods, USD 46.5 million for agriculture interventions, and USD 181.1 million for nutrition interventions. Additionally, the 2021 Revision of the Northern Ethiopia Response Plan called for USD 416.4 million for food, USD 75.5 million for nutrition and USD 70.9 million for agriculture interventions.

Northern Ethiopia response

- Provide at scale support for the 2022 Meher production season commencing in May and optimize the window provided by the cessation of hostilities to facilitate the fast movement of agricultural inputs into Tigray region, prioritizing seed for staple food, fertilizer and veterinary supplies.
- Continue coordinated efforts on humanitarian access and leverage every opportunity to scale up food and nutrition assistance, particularly to populations considered to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response**Drought response**

- Support drought-affected populations through life-sustaining food and nutrition assistance, including unconditional cash along with livelihood support such as drought tolerant seeds and fertilizer to maintain production capacity.
- Enhance access to livestock watering points, feed, mineral blocks and veterinary services to protect animal health and increase/stabilize milk production. If suitable, support destocking and protein supplementation to drought affected households.
- Provide water-trucking interventions for domestic and livestock usage, with distribution of water storage tanks in drought-affected areas.
- Continue the augmentation of logistics coordination and services in the Somali region through the creation of logistics hubs as well as additional warehouse and transport capacity to support humanitarian partners responding to those affected by the drought.
- Scale up school feeding as a crucial social safety net in the Somali and Oromia regions, supporting households and helping students to focus during their classes and retain more knowledge during their education.

The Republic of Kenya

Key drivers of food insecurity: prolonged drought, crop pests, rising food prices

The combination of a prolonged drought, an outbreak of African armyworm and rising food prices is expected to further escalate already high levels of acute food insecurity.

The worst drought in decades is now considered more likely given that three below-average rainy seasons have already been observed across the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Further, the start to the 2022 long rains has been poor and forecasts suggest below-average rains will continue through to the end of the season in May 2022.^{179, 180} Additionally, the ongoing outbreak of the African armyworm¹⁸¹ could contribute to reducing agricultural outputs.

Below-average harvests, along with increasing international food prices, have driven food inflation rates from 5 percent in early 2021 to 8–10 percent in March 2022 (year-on-year).¹⁸² Food prices are expected to escalate further due to a likely reduced long rains harvest in drought-affected areas in 2022¹⁸³ and further increases in already elevated international prices linked to the

war in Ukraine.¹⁸⁴ High international commodity prices, especially of fuel and food, will also inflate Kenya's import bill in 2022 and further increase its already high trade deficit and debt vulnerabilities (64.8 percent of GDP in 2021).¹⁸⁵ Resource-based conflicts are rising in drought-affected areas,¹⁸⁶ with possible impacts on livelihood activities, access to essential services and already high humanitarian access constraints.¹⁸⁷

In the ASALs, 3.5 million people are projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between March and June 2022 – including 758 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – a 75 percent increase compared to the same period in 2021.¹⁸⁸ Marsabit has the highest prevalence of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) at 20 percent of its population.¹⁸⁹ The nutrition situation is also alarming with record GAM prevalence observed in Mandera (34.7 percent) and Garissa (24.7 percent), while Wajir has seen the highest GAM prevalence since the drought of 2011.^{190, 191}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Scale up life-saving food and nutrition interventions (including cash-based assistance) to meet the immediate food needs of populations at high risk and protect the livelihoods of those affected by the drought.
- Safeguard the livelihoods of farmers, pastoralists and agropastoralists, and support the quick recovery of seasonal food production and their self-reliance. Context-specific livelihood packages should be provided, consisting of cash, productive inputs and subsidies for basic productive services (e.g. tractor and irrigation hours).
- Support infrastructure rehabilitation including water points and feeder roads.
- Support national social protection systems, including Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme, to respond to the impacts of the drought on the most vulnerable categories of the population.

The Federal Republic of Somalia

Key drivers of food insecurity: prolonged drought, conflict, high food prices

The combination of a prolonged drought, increasing conflict, and rising food prices is projected to drive food insecurity up, reaching catastrophic levels for more than 81 000 people by June 2022 and with a Risk of Famine in several areas.¹⁹²

Following three consecutive seasons of severe rainfall deficits, resulting in below-average harvests, widespread livestock deaths and the climate and conflict-induced displacement of nearly 700 000 people, the start of the 2022 *Gu* rains has been delayed and rainfall forecasts show an increased probability that below-average rains will continue.^{193, 194, 195} Should this occur, Somalia would face an unprecedented fourth consecutive failed rainy season.

Domestic food prices are increasing sharply, with cereal prices in southern Somalia exceeding the levels of the 2007–2008 and 2016–2017 food crises and rapidly approaching¹⁹⁶ levels of the 2011 famine. Due to Somalia's high food import dependency, food prices are expected to further increase in the outlook period, which is likely to be exacerbated by the fact that Somalia imports a large share of its wheat from the Russian Federation and Ukraine.¹⁹⁷ Continuously rising fuel and food prices (including cereals and cooking oil) will render these products inaccessible for many households.

Conflict and instability exacerbate the hunger crisis and displaced populations, further compounding already high humanitarian access constraints.¹⁹⁸ Livelihoods have been disrupted by violence, which is likely to further escalate around the much-delayed elections.¹⁹⁹

Marking a more than 120 percent increase compared to last year, more than six million people – 38 percent of the population – are estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between April and June 2022, including 1.7 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 81 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

Acute malnutrition levels are also high (13 percent) with a notable increase in SAM admissions in several states since January.^{200, 201}

There is also a Risk of Famine in the zones of Hawd Pastoral of Central and Hiran, Addun Pastoral of Northeast and Central, Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral and IDP settlements in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Dhusamareb through to June 2022. This is expected to occur if the 2022 *Gu* rains are significantly below average, there are substantial food price increases, increased levels of conflict and displacement, and if humanitarian assistance fails to keep up with increased needs and is unable to reach worst-affected areas.²⁰²

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 624 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 179 million for nutrition interventions.

- Continue scaling up life-saving and life-sustaining emergency responses through unconditional food and cash-based transfers to vulnerable populations, prioritizing assistance in areas that have experienced significant influxes of newly displaced populations to avoid large-scale loss of life, and populations exhibiting acute food insecurity and who are at risk of Emergency or Catastrophe levels of food insecurity (IPC Phases 4 and 5).
- Distribute animal feed and animal health support, including mineral blocks, range cubes, vaccinations and treatment to vulnerable agropastoralists in drought-affected areas of the country.
- Continue providing curative and preventive nutrition services to moderately acute malnourished children under five years of age, malnourished pregnant and lactating women and nutritionally vulnerable children and pregnant and lactating women. Augment logistics coordination and services, and in particular, the transportation capacity of government and partners to deliver urgent humanitarian assistance into and within Somalia, especially to rural areas.
- Sustain the government-led national Safety Net for Human Capital Programme (SNHCP) to continue providing unconditional cash-based transfers to vulnerable people, helping them meet their food needs and smooth consumption gaps through predictable and reliable provision of cash transfers.
- Scale up school feeding to keep children in schools, improve girls' enrolment and learning outcomes, improve health and nutritional status and provide a safety net for vulnerable households and mitigate the worst impacts of the drought.
- Provide livelihood support activities and services, skills, assets and infrastructure to households and communities to prevent erosion of gains and create pathways for sustainable recovery.

The Republic of South Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: flooding, below-average rain, macroeconomic challenges, subnational conflict

An anticipated fourth year of flooding²⁰³ and ever-increasing cost of living, coupled with the lingering impacts of prolonged conflict and the peak of the lean season, are likely to aggravate the severity of food insecurity, including the continued presence of people in catastrophic conditions in the outlook period.

The 2021 cereal production is estimated to be slightly below previous year's level and well below pre-conflict levels due to the compounding effects of consecutive unprecedented floods, below-average rains and insecurity in major crop producing areas of the country.²⁰⁴ The 2022 cereal gap relative to needs is estimated at 40 percent – 16 percent higher than the five-year average.²⁰⁵ Insufficient domestic supplies and high reliance on imports to meet cereal demand are likely to increase commodity prices and further constrain household purchasing power that has already been eroded by severe macroeconomic difficulties – including inflation, currency weakness and high debt burden.²⁰⁶ In the coming months, disruptions in trade and market activities due to insecurity, deterioration of infrastructure during the rainy season and other lean season factors

– such as limited livelihood opportunities and exceptionally high food prices²⁰⁷ – will further constrain access to food.

Fighting and insecurity, including looting of humanitarian supplies and attacks against humanitarian workers continue to hinder humanitarian access, leading to very high constraints.²⁰⁸ Insecurity incidents and related displacements coupled with flooding have pushed the number of IDPs up from 1.7 million in 2020 to 2 million at the beginning of 2022.²⁰⁹ Resource-based intercommunal conflicts are expected to intensify as the lean season progresses, leading to further displacement and disruption of livelihood activities.²¹⁰

An estimated 7.7 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse levels (IPC Phase 3 or above) of acute food insecurity between April and July, including almost 2.9 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 87 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – a 17 percent increase of Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels compared to the same period last year.²¹¹ Populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are located in counties in Jonglei, Lakes and Unity states, and Greater Pibor Administrative Area.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Preposition food prior to the rainy season to mitigate disruptions of emergency food distributions in most areas as much of the country's road network degrades with the onset of the rainy season and becomes impassable, especially during the peak of the rainy season (June to August).
- To mitigate impacts of potential floods once an early warning threshold has been reached:
 - Disseminate last mile, tailored early warning information and advisories on how to protect lives and livelihoods ahead of a flood event.
 - Distribute flood-proof storage systems to protect valuables and agricultural assets.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP called for USD 650 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 230 million for nutrition interventions.
- Scale up unconditional food and cash transfers, and emergency livelihood assistance to vulnerable populations, returnees and IDPs, particularly women and children in areas with populations in Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phases 4 and 5).
 - Leverage life-saving humanitarian programming in hotspots for hunger and violence, including in hard-to-reach locations, for more proactive contributions to peace.
 - Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce integration with water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions and with health partners.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Support local peacebuilding initiatives to reduce subnational and intercommunal violence that may arise due to population movements and increased competition for natural resources.
- Invest in capital-intensive assets that decrease the overall costs of humanitarian initiatives including road infrastructure and dykes to withstand flooding.
- Improve monitoring of the nutrition situation through surveys, particularly in counties with Critical or worse levels of acute malnutrition.

Southern Africa

The Republic of Angola

Key drivers of food insecurity: drought, high food prices

A fifth consecutive year of drought conditions in parts of the southern provinces – the worst in the last 40 years in some areas²¹² – and high food prices continue to drive food insecurity.

Although rainfall amounts improved slightly towards the end of the current production season in southwestern provinces,²¹³ they were insufficient to mitigate deficits experienced during key growing periods, resulting in poor conditions of the 2022 cereal crops.²¹⁴ Delays in pastures’ recovery resulting from the consecutive years of below-average rainfall will further negatively affect livestock production in the outlook period.²¹⁵ Food deficits are expected to persist in the affected areas even during the current post-harvest period,²¹⁶ and although agricultural production prospects are more favourable in other parts of the country.²¹⁷

As a result of the high global crude oil prices, increasing export revenues are expected to stabilize the economy of the third largest oil producing country in Africa.²¹⁸ However, economic recessions in the previous five years have pushed the unemployment rate

to 33 percent²¹⁹ and 54 percent of the population into extreme poverty.²²⁰ High food inflation, which stood at 33 percent year-on-year in March 2022,²²¹ is further limiting poor households’ economic access to food. Moreover, 2022 is a presidential election year and there have been an increasing number of strikes in relation to the elections.²²²

The latest IPC analysis for the southern provinces shows that between October 2021 and February 2022, 1.58 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) levels of acute food insecurity – including 417 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In March 2022, the share of households with insufficient food consumption was highest in Namibe (30 to 40 percent), while only moderately lower in the provinces of Huambo, Huila and Cunene (all 20 to 30 percent).²²³ The nutrition situation has also deteriorated in these provinces with 114 000 children projected to be acutely malnourished in 2022.²²⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute post-harvest storage equipment to mitigate potential harvest losses, and conduct training on managing food stocks.
- Provide inputs such as short-cycle crops and vegetable seeds for off season crop production to protect the food security of the most vulnerable in the southwest of the country.
- Install and maintain water-harvesting structures, such as water-reservoir tanks, ahead of the rainy season starting in October.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The Angola Emergency Response Plan 2021–2022 calls for USD 55.5 million for agriculture and food security, and USD 11.4 million for nutrition interventions.
- Implement a cash+ strategy to assist vulnerable households in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) to meet their immediate food and livelihood needs.
 - Increase the scope of agricultural-based emergency livelihood activities aimed at the most vulnerable and food-insecure households.
 - Increase the scope of nutritional support interventions, including the treatment of acute malnutrition and the prevention of malnutrition.
 - Scale up outreach to migrant camps to facilitate access to health care and enable screening and referral for malnutrition cases.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Strengthen capacities of national institutions for vulnerability assessments, and food security and nutrition monitoring.
- Support national emergency preparedness systems and national social protection schemes for anticipatory action ahead of climatic and economic shocks.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Key drivers of food insecurity: protracted conflict, high food prices

Localized insecurity in the eastern provinces and rising food prices are expected to have major effects on food insecurity in the outlook period. Armed groups will likely intensify their operations in the coming months, especially in North Kivu and Ituri²²⁵ driving displacement and worsening already extreme humanitarian access constraints.²²⁶

Since mid-2021, violence and conflict have significantly increased in eastern provinces due to joint multinational military operations against several armed groups. These operations have pushed armed groups into new territories resulting in increased attacks on civilians²²⁷ and this has triggered the resurgence of previously dormant groups especially in North Kivu and Ituri provinces. Recent events in the town of Rutshuru (North Kivu province) have triggered the displacement of around 53 000 people.²²⁸ Furthermore, attacks against humanitarian convoys have also increased, causing operational disruptions to assistance efforts.

Across the country, consumers are facing high prices for both domestically produced and imported food commodities, such

as maize and vegetable oil, driven by increasing transportation costs and high global prices.²²⁹ Relying on imported food – around 23 percent of cereals are imported²³⁰ – and refined petroleum, the country is exposed to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine.^{231, 232}

The latest IPC analysis from September 2021 projected that 25.9 million people – 25 percent of the population analysed – would be facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of food insecurity from January to June 2022 nationwide, including 5.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²³³ Overall, this would mark a slight improvement from the 27.3 million in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) for the same period in 2021. As a result of the recent escalation in conflicts and population movements, however, the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity could increase especially in Rutshuru (North Kivu province), Djugu and Mahagi (Ituri province) and parts of South Kivu province. In 70 health zones (out of the 503), 860 000 children under the age of five and 470 000 pregnant or lactating women are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022.²³⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Preposition agricultural stocks in strategic locations in eastern provinces to provide rapid support to households affected by new episodes of conflict, thus mitigating the immediate consequences on livelihoods and food security.
- Establish community gardens in pre-identified “safe spaces” for families to access fresh food despite increasing conflict and instability.
- Distribute cash+ to vulnerable rural households through livelihoods assistance, following a conflict-sensitive approach in volatile areas to mitigate a potential deterioration in food security.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The Democratic Republic of the Congo Emergency Response Plan 2022 calls for USD 764.8 million for food security, and USD 258.6 million for nutrition interventions.
- Sustain and adapt conflict-sensitive approaches, to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance that can save the lives and livelihoods of people projected to face high levels of food insecurity in 2022.
 - Scale up agriculture-based emergency livelihood activities targeting the most vulnerable, food insecure households.
 - Scale up nutritional support interventions, including treatment of acute malnutrition and malnutrition prevention.

The Republic of Madagascar

Key drivers of food insecurity: drought conditions, cyclones and tropical storms, high prices of staple foods

Severe drought conditions in the southern and southwestern parts of the Grand Sud have sharply reduced crop production prospects and amid currently rising food prices, food insecurity is expected to worsen.

Substantial rainfall deficits in southern regions have sharply reduced 2022 crop production prospects, following three consecutive years of already very poor harvests. In addition, heavy rainfall across the country, due to the passage of three cyclones and one tropical storm between January and March, resulted in the inundation of an estimated 432 000 ha of cropped land – approximately 13 percent of the cropped area.²³⁵

Low demand for agricultural labour due to this year’s poor cropping season, combined with the impact of previous poor harvests, have curtailed incomes and therefore households’ ability to purchase essential goods and services. Moreover, food prices have risen steeply. In February, prices of imported oil had increased by 25 percent on a yearly basis, 13 percent for local rice, 12 percent for

imported rice and 10 percent for cassava,²³⁶ adding further pressure to households’ scarce resources. Madagascar is import dependent for several food commodities, including wheat and sunflower oil,²³⁷ and upward pressure on already elevated international prices could lead to additional domestic price rises.

Although humanitarian assistance has recorded broad coverage in terms of number of beneficiaries in recent months, preventing previously projected catastrophic outcomes, the response remains insufficient to sustainably meet households’ consumption deficits, leaving them in need of urgent action. Between May and August, about 1.1 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 182 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²³⁸ The poor seasonal performance combined with high food prices and impact of cyclones is likely to lead to higher acute food insecurity outcomes in the months ahead. While, the nutrition situation remains stable, 5 out of 15 districts in the Grand Sud continue to show high proxy-GAM levels, between 10–15 percent according to the first trimester screening.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Expand activities to support household livelihoods and resilience to dry conditions, such as improved efficiency of existing irrigation schemes, rehabilitation of water access points and promote drought pasture reserves.
- Provide livestock support to mitigate drought and disease-induced mortality and morbidity, such as feed, vaccination kits and treatments in Grand Sud before June.
- Provide agricultural inputs to support the upcoming potato growing season that starts in September.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- In accordance with the Madagascar Grand Sud Flash Appeal, secure timely additional funding to continue and scale up the provision of livelihood, food and nutrition assistance to vulnerable populations.
- Scale up emergency food, nutrition and cash+ assistance during the lean season, with special attention to households in Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 or above), to cover extreme gaps in food consumption through the peak of the lean season.
- Diversify sources of income for vulnerable households through access to small-scale livestock (poultry, goats, sheep).

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- The 2022 Madagascar Grand Sud Flash Appeal calls for USD 52.5 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 4.8 million for nutrition interventions.²³⁹ Seasonal and investment interventions such as reinforcing existing logistical bases to ensure proper prepositioning of life-saving food and non-food stocks.
- Conduct an in-depth nutrition assessment to evaluate the consequences of food insecurity on nutrition.

The Republic of Mozambique

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict in Cabo Delgado, rainfall deficits, recurrent natural shocks

The combined effects of the conflict in Cabo Delgado and erratic rains across the country are likely to continue to drive food insecurity in Mozambique.

Largely sporadic attacks in late 2021 have become more frequent since the beginning of 2022, indicating a potential new wave of insecurity and displacement.²⁴⁰ In Nangade district, 39 organized political violence events were recorded in the first quarter of 2022, compared to 14 in the last quarter of 2021.²⁴¹ In February 2022, attacks by armed groups, particularly in Cabo Delgado's Meluco and Nangade districts, resulted in the displacement of 10 209 people, of which 49 percent were children.²⁴²

Several successive tropical systems in January–March caused significant flooding and damage to infrastructure and croplands, mainly in the provinces of Nampula and Zambezia, but also in Sofala, Tete, Niassa and Manica. Over 736 000 people were affected by Cyclone Gombé alone, and around 91 100 ha of croplands were

devastated, and livestock and fisheries sectors affected.²⁴³ When combined with drought conditions early in the season in the northern provinces and later in the southern provinces,²⁴⁴ this is likely to have an impact on the upcoming harvest.²⁴⁵ Areas affected by drought, flooding and conflict will face elevated food prices due to limited supply and increased demand for market purchases.²⁴⁶

Between April and September 2022, 1.4 million people – 10 percent of the population analysed – are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) conditions, including approximately 24 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²⁴⁷ The large majority, 1.1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 23 500 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), are located in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia, and affected by the ongoing conflict, where access constraints remain high.²⁴⁸ This is an 18 percent year-on-year increase when 957 000 people were projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above).²⁴⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide unconditional cash transfers to support livelihood and household consumption needs for IDPs and host families affected by conflict, displacement and below-average harvests in Cabo Delgado.
- Preposition strategic stocks of agricultural inputs to allow for a rapid distribution to people affected by conflict.
- Scale up social protection support for vulnerable population groups forecasted to be exposed to climate events.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP called for USD 184.8 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 19.4 million for nutrition interventions.
- Strengthen advocacy for improved humanitarian access, to support scale up of conflict-sensitive, life-saving assistance especially in Cabo Delgado.
 - Support shock-responsive national social protection schemes and emergency preparedness systems for IDPs and host families.
 - Increase agricultural-based emergency livelihood activities aimed at the most vulnerable, food-insecure households, as well as nutritional support interventions such as acute malnutrition treatment and malnutrition prevention.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Identify lessons learned from the 2022 cyclone season and invest in smart preparatory actions such as reinforcing existing logistical bases to ensure effective prepositioning of life-saving food and non-food stocks.

The Republic of Zimbabwe

Key drivers of food insecurity: prolonged dry spells, high food and fuel prices

An expected decrease in crop production in 2022 and the adverse effects of persistently high inflation rates are foreseen to stress food insecurity in the outlook period.

Rainfall deficits²⁵⁰ throughout the season have lowered yield expectations of the 2022 cereal crop and caused permanent crop wilting in areas of Manicaland, Masvingo, Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. Together with a cutback in the cereal acreage, officially estimated to be 3 percent down year-on-year,²⁵¹ cereal production is foreseen to fall to below-average levels in 2022. Lower production would both reduce income-earning opportunities for farming households and cut into domestic cereal supplies, which could put further pressure on prices.

The unfavourable crop production outlook is set against a protracted economic crisis, characterized by high inflation rates that have sharply eroded households' purchasing power. Prices of essential products have continued to increase in 2022. The cost of the basic food basket in April had a year-on-year increase of 131 percent, with vegetable oil seeing the biggest price spike of 207 percent over this period. Prices are anticipated to come under further upward pressure

in consideration of the increasing international prices. For example, fuel prices have risen 26 percent between March 2021 and 2022.²⁵² In addition, the availability of maize, the key staple food, remained low, with only 10 percent of monitored rural and 16 percent of monitored urban markets reporting normal supply levels.²⁵³ A continuation of the war in Ukraine could further exacerbate supply disruptions and food price increases. For instance, Zimbabwe is 60 and 30 percent import-dependent on wheat and sunflower oil, respectively.²⁵⁴ Further price increases of agricultural inputs (i.e. fuel and fertilizers) would diminish households' ability to purchase these goods for the next cropping season, starting from September 2022.²⁵⁵

An estimated 2.9 million people in rural areas were food insecure during the January to March 2022 lean season.²⁵⁶ According to FEWS NET, high acute food insecurity will likely persist until at least September in the areas where large shortfalls in cereal production are expected, as rural households will deplete their stocks faster and rely on markets to meet their food needs.²⁵⁷ Low-income urban households are also likely to face acute food insecurity given the effects of high food and fuel prices, with limited income-earning opportunities.²⁵⁸

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Facilitate access and provide seeds and fertilizers to support wheat farmers before the planting season ends in June.
- Build up livestock feed reserves in anticipation of an earlier depletion of feed stocks and pasture.
- Scale up training and awareness on conservation agriculture (Pfumvudza) practices in order to minimize crop losses during dry spells in the upcoming season.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Sustain and scale up livelihood, food and nutrition assistance, both in rural and urban areas.
- Sustain and support analysis and monitoring systems to track price fluctuations and other indicators of economic instability to inform anticipatory action as well as response programming.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Strengthen interventions to minimize post-harvest losses to conserve the potentially reduced harvest.

Near East, North Africa and Europe

The Lebanese Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, political instability

The rise of international commodity prices, accelerated after the inception of the war in Ukraine, is set to further deteriorate Lebanon's economic crisis, which has been ongoing for the last two years.

Despite the partial economic stabilization in January 2022 due to injections of US dollars by the Central Bank,²⁵⁹ inflation is likely to sharply accelerate again due to the increase of international prices of key commodities, including wheat and fuel, aggravated by the war in Ukraine.²⁶⁰

Imports cover almost the entirety of Lebanon's cereal and energy needs, making the country vulnerable to external shocks. Furthermore, Lebanon imports over 60 percent of its wheat directly from Ukraine,²⁶¹ which is likely to cause disruptions and additional costs as authorities look for alternative import sources.

The current rise of commodity prices is occurring against the backdrop of Lebanon's worst economic crisis since the 1990s. The economy has seen a 21.4 percent contraction in 2020 and is expected to have contracted by 10.5 percent in 2021.²⁶² The Lebanese pound (LBP) – which had been traditionally pegged to the

dollar at the rate of LBP 1 507.50/USD 1 – has lost over 90 percent of its value, reaching peaks of LBP 30 000/USD 1 in January 2022 and recording new heights beyond LBP 27 000 in April. This rapid depreciation and shortages of essential items including fuel and medicines have boosted already high food inflation rates, which as of February 2022 stood at 396 percent.²⁶³ Overall, increasing prices and declining GDP per capita have contributed to exacerbate the country's poverty rate, which reached 74 percent in 2021.²⁶⁴

The result of parliamentary elections, scheduled on 15 May,²⁶⁵ is unlikely to break the political stalemate²⁶⁶ and the rising political tensions that have undermined attempts to obtain key financial support from international organizations²⁶⁷ and donor countries.²⁶⁸

Last year, the worsening economic crisis pushed levels of food insecurity even higher. According to a research conducted by WFP in September and December 2021, almost 1.8 million Lebanese citizens – 46 percent of the total population²⁶⁹ – as determined based on WFP's rCARI methodology,* and 735 000 Syrian refugees (49 percent of the total Syrian refugee population)²⁷⁰ as determined based on WFP's CARI methodology are estimated to be food insecure in 2021.

* Comparability between IPC/CH and WFP rCARI is not established. Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed. Data used relates to acute food insecurity. See related endnote for more detail.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide animal health treatments such as vaccination and deworming tablets to vulnerable livestock herders and distribute feed for small ruminants.
- Support small-scale farmers through the provision of vouchers to purchase agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer, equipment), contributing to their ability to maintain agricultural activities ahead of the barley and wheat planting season from September onwards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The Lebanon Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 2021–2022 calls for USD 115.4 million for food security, and USD 25 million for nutrition interventions.
- Given the prevailing economic situation, partners' interventions shall continue to be channelled to Lebanese and migrants at higher risk of vulnerability using the preferred assistance options so as to be cost-efficient, mitigate tensions and benefit from previous lessons learned. This takes into consideration the country's inflation levels, the devaluation of the LBP due to exchange rate fluctuations and the potential disruption of supply chains.
 - Strengthen and expand safety net programmes through consistent, regular engagement with government ministries and municipal stakeholders. This includes accelerated technical assistance and capacity strengthening. This revision of the ERP will continue to complement assistance to other response frameworks including the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and safety nets programming.

The Republic of the Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: high food prices, below-average harvest, intercommunal violence

The macroeconomic crisis and rising food prices, insufficient crop production and intercommunal conflict are likely to further aggravate food insecurity levels during the outlook period – which coincides with the lean season.

The Sudan continues to face a macroeconomic crisis, amid political instability, the suspension of international financial assistance, currency depreciation and elevated inflation²⁷¹ – which reached 263.2 percent in March year-on-year.²⁷² Food inflation will remain elevated due to below-average crop production, the removal of fuel and wheat subsidies, rising costs of key agricultural inputs (seeds, fuel, fertilizer, agricultural machineries and labour) and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine. Below-average 2021 national cereal production – which was 30 percent below the five-year average – contributed to prices of sorghum remaining firm, and prices of millet increased by 15–40 percent between October 2021 and January 2022 in contrast to normal seasonal trends.²⁷³ The impact of the war in Ukraine, occurring in a context of already elevated global prices, are likely to result in further food and energy price hikes.²⁷⁴ Indeed, the Sudan imports 85 percent of its wheat, the majority of which from the Russian Federation and Ukraine.²⁷⁵ Compounding the situation, the Government of the Sudan abandoned subsidies on

wheat in January.²⁷⁶ Such drivers will result in a further deterioration of purchasing power and affect food access.

IDPs – currently standing at over 3 million – remain among the most vulnerable.²⁷⁷ In Darfur, where most people requiring assistance are located and access is highly constrained, IDP numbers have increased throughout 2021 amid the withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.²⁷⁸ Intercommunal violence over land in the Darfur region is likely to continue to drive displacement. The insecurity has also eroded livelihoods, damaged farms, and triggered widespread unemployment.

Between October 2021 and February 2022, about 6 million people (13 percent of population analysed) were estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) – including over 1.3 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The lean season, starting in May, typically results in a significant increase in the number of food insecure people. The economic crisis, the impact of the below-average 2021 harvest and the war in Ukraine raising already high food prices, are likely to result in a further deterioration of the food security situation. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 10.9 million people are expected to require food and livelihood assistance in 2022 – up from 8.2 million in 2021.²⁷⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute seeds and agricultural inputs to vulnerable farmers ahead of the millet and sorghum planting season in June.
- Provide unconditional cash to farmers affected by the reduced March 2022 wheat harvest, ensuring they have the capacity to continue agricultural activities in the next season.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP calls for USD 708.3 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 160 million for nutrition interventions.
- Continue life-saving support to the most vulnerable population identified by relevant food security assessments.
 - Provide host communities with agricultural livelihood and food assistance through in-kind and cash transfers.
 - Sustain life-saving assistance to IDPs and refugees who have fled into the Sudan from Ethiopia's Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz regions.
 - Provide comprehensive food security and nutrition programming in vulnerable areas, in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where humanitarian access is possible for the first time in ten years.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Explore contingency corridors into the Sudan, noting supply chain delays at Port Sudan.
- Create sustainable and stable livelihood opportunities, especially for the most vulnerable groups such as women, through schemes such as Productive Safety Nets that promote building or rehabilitation of assets and improve long-term food security and resilience.

The Syrian Arab Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic crisis, dry conditions

The dramatic economic situation in the Syrian Arab Republic is set to further deteriorate due to the increasing prices for food commodities and some key agriculture inputs, erratic rainfall and expected below-average domestic cereal production, potentially driving a significant number of additional people into food insecurity.²⁸⁰ Furthermore, the northwest of the country is constantly at risk of new high-intensity hostilities between government and rebel forces, while the conditions of the refugees displaced in the area are deteriorating.²⁸¹ The situation would be exacerbated should the UN Security Council Resolution 2585 that currently allows for cross-border humanitarian operations from Turkey not be renewed.²⁸²

Food inflation has kept increasing steadily.²⁸³ In March 2022, the price of a reference food basket reached a historical peak, marking a 71 percent increase year-on-year. Prices have been inflated by shortages of essential items caused by economic sanctions and the devaluation of the Syrian currency, hence affecting the financing for imports.²⁸⁴ The start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 has coincided with the resumption of the currency's depreciation, following the imposition of strict western sanctions on the Russian

financial system, with which Syrian banks and authorities had developed close linkages.²⁸⁵

Over the last decade, the Russian Federation had become one of the Syrian Arab Republic's main origin of food imports, particularly of wheat as domestic production has decreased due to low availability, high production input prices, extreme climatic conditions and water scarcity.²⁸⁶ Agricultural production is likely to decline further in 2022, given protracted critical climatic conditions and the scarcity of key inputs.²⁸⁷

As determined based on WFP's CARI methodology, in June 2021, 12 million Syrians²⁸⁸ were facing acute food insecurity due to the combined effects of economic crisis, ongoing conflict and displacement. Of these, 2.5 million people were severely food insecure, including 1.8 million people living in IDP camps.^{*289} Additionally, 1.9 million Syrians are classified as at risk of sliding into food insecurity.²⁹⁰ Access constraints remain extreme,²⁹¹ and access is not fully secured in various regions, particularly in the northeast and northwest.

* Data used relates to acute food insecurity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide seeds, fertilizers and cash to support land preparation for the upcoming wheat season in September.
- Enhance farmers' access to irrigation water in order to support the agricultural production for the current season.
- Support farmers during harvesting, to market crops and enhance their access to agricultural mechanization during the July–August wheat harvest.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The HRP 2022–2023 calls for USD 247.6 million for early recovery and livelihoods, USD 1.71 billion for food security and agriculture, and USD 124.1 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide vulnerable farmers whose agricultural production has been damaged in the current season due to climatic conditions and various factors, with various agricultural production inputs in order to enhance their resilience.
- Provide livestock feed and veterinary kits to the most vulnerable herders affected from depleted grazing availability resulting from the La Niña-induced drought conditions during the last two years.
- Provide livelihood and food assistance to the most vulnerable agricultural families for a period not exceeding six months in order to support resilience.
- Increase cross-line food delivery into the northwest of the Syrian Arab Republic to complement cross-border modalities.
- Continue the provision of in-kind food assistance to food-insecure families across the country and increase hybrid cash assistance to the most vulnerable among them, to support their eroded purchasing power.
- Preposition food in the northwest of the Syrian Arab Republic ahead of the expiration of the cross-border resolution.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Renew high-level advocacy to maintain access to the northwest of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to enhance resource mobilization, visibility and flexible funding amid the impact of the war in Ukraine.
- Develop a contingency plan for the possibility of a non-renewal of UN Security Council Resolution 2585 – including the prepositioning of three months of stocks in the northwest of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Ukraine

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict

The war that began on 24 February 2022 continues to drive unprecedented levels of humanitarian and protection needs²⁹² amongst the Ukrainian population in several cities and rural areas in the northeast, east and south.²⁹³ As of 16 May, more than 6.3 million Ukrainians left as refugees²⁹⁴ and 8 million were internally displaced.²⁹⁵ The April update of the Humanitarian Flash Appeal indicates that among the 15.7 million people in need, 10.2 million people are in urgent need of Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) support.²⁹⁶

Recent field reports and assessments indicate extraordinary impacts on lives, livelihoods, food security and nutrition. Between mid-March and mid-April, one-third of households were found to be food insecure, as determined based on WFP's rCARI methodology.*²⁹⁷ Oblasts in the eastern and southern parts of the country, as well as displaced or separated households, recorded the highest levels of food insecurity, with one in every two households of these groups being food insecure. Food access is a major concern, as households mainly depend on cash purchases of food – more than 30 percent of households reported not having any income or depending on assistance only. As conflict persists and supply chains on all levels are disrupted, people are likely to continue to experience access challenges.

Being a significant exporter of food commodities and relying on a good harvest in 2021 may provide some buffer stocks for livelihoods and incomes. However, food access rather than food availability will continue to be the immediate cause of rising needs in the country.

Prolonged conflict, combined with localized difficulties to secure sufficient quantities of fuel and essential agricultural inputs – including fertilizers, pesticides, equipment and livestock supplies – and availability of labour force, are also threatening to disrupt food production and livelihood activities during the ongoing spring crops (maize, sunflower seed and vegetables) planting season as well as the winter wheat harvesting season that is expected to start in July.²⁹⁸ In March 2022, almost half of the area planted with winter wheat and about 40 percent of area planted with rye for the 2022 harvest were in occupied or war-affected areas.²⁹⁹ While areas affected by direct fighting have shifted, the uncertainty about damages, losses and the actual harvestable area remains. Between 20 and 30 percent of these areas may remain unharvested in 2022.³⁰⁰ Yields are also likely to be adversely affected due to limited supplies of plant protection material.³⁰¹ As such, it remains uncertain to what extent farmers will be able to harvest standing crops, plant new ones, sustain livestock production and to market their products as the conflict evolves.

Humanitarian access remains limited in many areas, with increasing competition over logistics and transportation assets (such as trucks and drivers) and scarcity of fuel, especially in hardest-hit areas. Mariupol and other contested areas with active conflict in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts are some of the most inaccessible territories in Ukraine.

* Comparability between IPC/CH and WFP rCARI is not established. Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed. Data used relates to acute food insecurity. See related endnote for more detail.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Appeal for continuous, unimpeded access to families trapped in hard-to-reach, embattled cities in Ukraine to ensure they receive assistance.
- Provide in-kind livelihood and food assistance (including ready-to-eat rations) to families in encircled and conflict-affected areas as well as IDPs, and cash-based transfers in areas where markets are functioning.
- Provide food and nutrition assistance to refugees outside Ukraine in close coordination with host governments.
- Support local markets through the provision of cash assistance that increases the purchasing power of beneficiaries, including direct cash transfer, voucher and grant for agricultural production for vulnerable households in rural area.
- Support local supply chains through local food procurement.
- Support harvest in June–July, targeting smallholder and medium-sized farmers through the cash+ and voucher modality.
- Provide wheat production packages to enable planting in October.
- Provide small livestock and distribute mineral supplements, feed and animal health kits to sustain the production of meat, eggs and dairy, and bolster household consumption.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Strengthen ongoing efforts to monitor acute food insecurity through the IPC process and related early warning in countries whose food security is at risk to be affected by the secondary impacts of the war in Ukraine.

The Republic of Yemen

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict and economic crisis

A new high in acute food insecurity is likely to be reached as the economic crisis is further exacerbated by potential continuing conflict and high international food prices, while humanitarian food assistance is reduced amid very high access constraints. A Risk of Famine could materialize in a plausible worst-case scenario.³⁰²

Macroeconomic decline is likely to continue constraining the capacity to import food and fuel. Capacity is further hampered by elevated international food prices and reduced cereal availability partly the result of the war in Ukraine. Yemen is also directly affected by the conflict, as it sourced more than 40 percent of imported cereals from the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Rising international fuel prices will also keep increasing maritime transportation costs, disrupting supply. As a result, food prices are rising and likely to continue. The cost of the Minimum Food Basket in February 2022 increased by 85 percent in internationally recognized government areas, and 37 percent in areas controlled by Sana'a-based authorities, compared to the same period last year.³⁰³ The situation will be compounded by recurrent droughts and dry spells, floods and cyclone.³⁰⁴

A two-month truce was signed at the beginning of April³⁰⁵ – the first countrywide truce since 2016 – following an increase in the intensity of conflict in the first quarter of 2022.³⁰⁶ Despite reports about continued fighting in some areas,³⁰⁷ the truce has so far led to a rare reduction of hostilities.³⁰⁸ At the time of writing, it was unclear if the truce would be extended beyond May.

In a stark deterioration compared to last year with over 19 million people expected to experience Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity – including 7.1 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – between June and December 2022. This is based on assumptions of conflict continuing, economic crisis aggravating and shrinking of humanitarian assistance. The limited resources will continue to force humanitarian actors in the country to further reduce their assistance packages and their target population.³⁰⁹

Of greatest concern are 161 000 people expected to reach Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)³¹⁰ and a Risk of Famine in the districts of Abs and Hayran in Hajjah Governorate under the worst-case scenario for June–December 2022. Additionally, should a worst-case scenario apply for a protracted period beyond December, also Al Hali and Al Hawak districts in Al Hudaydah governorate could shift into Famine.³¹¹

Projected levels of food insecurity represent a major deterioration compared to the January–May 2022 period, when nearly 17.4 million people were estimated to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) – including 5.6 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 31 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). IDPs – which amount to over 4 million³¹² – remain among the most vulnerable. Acute malnutrition is also projected to dramatically increase in severity during the projection period. Approximately 2.2 million children under the age of five and about 1.3 million pregnant and lactating women are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide seeds and agricultural inputs to vulnerable smallholders ahead of the wheat planting season in June.
- Support livestock herders with animal health treatment kits to mitigate animal diseases that are projected for the upcoming season.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP called for USD 2.1 billion for food security and agriculture, and USD 442 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide unconditional cash transfers and implement cash-for-work activities to mitigate the impact of food-price inflation on the most vulnerable people.
- Continue to provide fuel to health centres and local water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities through the Bilateral Service Provision (BSP) activity.
- Improve access to livelihood opportunities and rehabilitating food security assets and infrastructure in areas with high levels of food insecurity.

OTHER KEY ACTIONS

- Conduct a forecast analysis considering upcoming harvest seasons and locations to plan targeted interventions.
- Strengthen monitoring and early warning systems given the fragile context, the risk factors and key drivers of food insecurity and acute malnutrition, both internal and external such as the war in Ukraine.
- Conduct a countrywide beneficiary retargeting, registration and prioritization exercise, to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches the most vulnerable amid limited funding.

Glossary

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods regardless of the causes, context or duration. The IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five Phases of severity, ranging from IPC Phase 1, corresponding to No/Minimal acute food insecurity, to IPC Phase 5, corresponding to Catastrophe/Famine. Each of these phases has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene.

Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food security refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption required for an active and healthy life.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels, and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.

(For further details, please see http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf.)

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

(For further details, please see <http://ecoagris.cilss.int/index.php/analyse-cadre-harmonise/>.)

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households either have large food-consumption gaps – which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality – or are able to mitigate large food-consumption gaps by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. Households face critical levels of acute food insecurity/critical acute food insecurity. Urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. If nothing is done, the population could face starvation or death.

Catastrophe – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households face an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs, even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. Urgent, immediate action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death, and the total collapse of livelihoods. Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5).

Famine – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity scale. Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households has, or is most likely to have, an extreme deprivation of food and face starvation, death, destitution. Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition (at least 30 percent of children malnourished) and significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (at least 1 person for every 5 000 dies each day), are occurring. Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Famine Likely – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine Likely is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale (Phase 5), used to classify situations when Famine is likely occurring. If there is insufficient data for Famine classification, usually because either nutrition or mortality data are lacking, but the available information indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the Famine classification is called Famine Likely. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe; the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

Risk of Famine

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most-likely scenario, it is a worst-case scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

Food security

A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are usually four dimensions of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization and stability over time.

Food access

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability

The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being; and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

Coping strategies

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition, stunting, underweight and micronutrient deficiencies are all forms of undernutrition.

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To note: As determined based on WFP's rCARI methodology, severe food insecurity improved from 2.6 percent (1.3 million) in October–December 2021 to 2.1 percent (1 million) in January–March 2022. Data used relates to acute food insecurity. Figures are available in the interactive map at the bottom of the page. The WFP remote-CARI (rCARI) methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed.

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Global Network Against Food Crises

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are the founding members of the Global Network Against Food Crises, together with the European Commission for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). The Global Network seeks to better link, integrate and guide existing programmes and policy processes to sustainably address the root causes of food crises along the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus.

Within the Global Network's approach and framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods and value chains in order to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.

This report is part of a series of Global Network's analytical products contributing to the generation and sharing of consensus and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

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